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Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple vulnerabilities in Atlantis Word Processor

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Vulnerabilities discovered by Cory Duplantis and Ali Rizvi-Santiago of Cisco Talos.


Overview


Cisco Talos is disclosing several vulnerabilities discovered in Atlantis Word Processor. Atlantis Word Processor is a portable word processor that is also capable of converting any TXT, RTF, ODT, DOC, WRI, or DOCX document into an eBook in the ePub format.

TALOS-2018-0641 - Atlantis Word Processor Uninitialized TDocOleObject Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-3975)


An exploitable uninitialized variable vulnerability exists in the RTF-parsing functionality of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted RTF can leverage an uninitialized stack address, resulting in an out-of-bounds write. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.0.2.3, 3.0.2.5

TALOS-2018-0646 - Atlantis Word Processor Word Document Complex Piece Descriptor Table Fc.Compressed Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-3978)


An exploitable out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in the Word Document parser of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted document can cause Atlantis to write a value outside the bounds of a heap allocation, resulting in a buffer overflow. An attacker must convince a victim to open a specially crafted, malicious document in order to trigger this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.2.6

TALOS-2018-0650 - Atlantis Word Processor Word Document Endnote Reference Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-3982)


An exploitable arbitrary write vulnerability exists in the Word Document parser of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted document can cause Atlantis to skip the addition of elements to an array that is indexed by a loop. When reading from this array, the application will use an out-of-bounds index, which can result in arbitrary data being read as a pointer. Later, when the application attempts to write to said pointer, an arbitrary write will occur. This can allow an attacker to further corrupt memory and execute code under the context of the application. An attacker must convince a victim to open a malicious document in order to trigger this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.0.2.3, 3.0.2.5

TALOS-2018-0651 - Atlantis Word Processor Empty TTableRow TList Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-3983)


An exploitable near-null write vulnerability exists in the Word Document parser of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted document can cause an array to fetch a NULL pointer and then performs some arithmetic before writing a value to the result. Due to the application using the null pointer, there is arithmetic that can result in the pointer being larger than a few pages. This can corrupt heap memory, resulting in code execution under the context of the application. An attacker must convince a victim to open a document in order to trigger this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.0.2.3, 3.0.2.5

TALOS-2018-0652 - Atlantis Word Processor Word Document Paragraph Property (0xD608) sprmTDefTable Uninitialized Length Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-3984)


An exploitable uninitialized length vulnerability exists within the Word Document parser of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted document can cause Atlantis to skip initializing a value representing the number of columns of a table. Later, the application will use this as a length within a loop that will write to a pointer on the heap. A buffer overflow will occur due to this value being controlled, which can lead to code execution under the context of the application. An attacker must convince a victim to open a document in order to trigger this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.0.2.3, 3.0.2.5

TALOS-2018-0666 - Atlantis Word Processor Windows Enhanced Metafile Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-3998)


An exploitable heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the Windows Enhanced Metafile parser of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted image embedded within a document can cause an undersized allocation, resulting in an overflow when the application tries to read data into it. An attacker must convince a victim to open a malicious document in order to trigger this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.2.5.0

TALOS-2018-0667 - Atlantis Word Processor JPEG Length Underflow Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-3999)


An exploitable heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the JPEG parser of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted image embedded within a document can cause a length to be underflowed, which is then treated as unsigned. Later, when using this length in a copying operation, the application will write outside the bounds of a heap-buffer resulting in a buffer overflow. An attacker must convince a victim to open a malicious document in order to trigger this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.2.5.0

TALOS-2018-0668 - Atlantis Word Processor Office Open XML TTableRow Double Free Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-4000)


An exploitable double-free vulnerability exists in the Office Open XML parser of Atlantis Word Processor. A specially crafted document can cause a TTableRow instance to be referenced twice, resulting in a double-free vulnerability when both the references go out of scope. An attacker must convince a victim to open a malicious document in order to trigger this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Tested versions: Atlantis Word Processor 3.2.5.0


Coverage


The following Snort rules will detect exploitation attempts. Note that additional rules may be released at a future date, and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rules: 47403 - 47412, 47456 - 47457, 47527 - 47528, 47523 - 47524, 47521 - 47522, 47758 - 47760, 47755 - 47756, 47762 - 47763


Vulnerability Spotlight: Multiple Issues in Foxit PDF Reader

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Vulnerabilities discovered by Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos

Overview


Cisco Talos is disclosing eightteen vulnerabilities in Foxit PDF Reader, a popular free program for viewing, creating and editing PDF documents. It is commonly used as an alternative to Adobe Acrobat Reader and has a widely used browser plugin.



Details

 

TALOS-2018-0607


TALOS-2018-0607 / CVE-2018-3940 is an exploitable use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine that can result in remote code execution. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees numerous of used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute, potentially leading to a user-after-free condition. This particular vulnerability lies in invoking the 'removeDataObject' method of the active document, resulting in arbitrary code execution.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack, including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0608


TALOS-2018-0608 / CVE-2018-3941 is an exploitable use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine that can result in remote code execution. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees numerous used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute, potentially leading to a user-after-free condition. This particular vulnerability lies in invoking the 'getNthFieldName' method of the active document resulting in arbitrary code execution.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0609


TALOS-2018-0609 / CVE-2018-3942 is an exploitable use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine that can result in remote code execution. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees numerous of used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute, potentially leading to a user-after-free condition. This particular vulnerability lies in invoking the 'getPageRotation' method of the active document resulting in arbitrary code execution.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack, including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0610


TALOS-2018-0610 / CVE-2018-3943 is an exploitable use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine that can result in remote code execution. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees many used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute, potentially leading to a user-after-free condition. This particular vulnerability lies in invoking the 'getPageBox' method of the active document resulting in arbitrary code execution.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0611


TALOS-2018-0611 / CVE-2018-3944 is an exploitable use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine that can result in remote code execution. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees several used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute, potentially leading to a user-after-free condition. This particular vulnerability lies in invoking the 'JSON.Stringify' method of the active document resulting in arbitrary code execution.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0612


TALOS-2018-0612 / CVE-2018-3945 is an exploitable use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine that can result in remote code execution. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees numerous of used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute, potentially leading to a user-after-free condition. This particular vulnerability lies in invoking the 'this.info' object followed by calling the 'JSON.stringify' method of the active document resulting in arbitrary code execution.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0613


TALOS-2018-0613 / CVE-2018-3946 is an exploitable use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine that can result in remote code execution. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees numerous used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute, potentially leading to a user-after-free condition. This particular vulnerability lies in invoking the 'getPageNthWord' method of the active document resulting in arbitrary code execution.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.

TALOS-2018-0628


TALOS-2018-0628 references a total of six separate use-after-free vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-3957, CVE-2018-3958, CVE-2018-3959, CVE-2018-3960, CVE-2018-3961, CVE-2018-3962) found in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader that can be abused to execute arbitrary code.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0629


TALOS-2018-0629 / CVE-2018-3964 is a use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader that can be abused to execute arbitrary code. This particular vulnerability leverages the invocation of the 'getPageNumWords' method of the active document with a crafted object as an argument.


There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0630


TALOS-2018-0630 / CVE-2018-3965 is a use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader that can be abused to execute arbitrary code. This particular vulnerability leverages a saved reference to the 'this.bookmarkRoot.children' object, triggering the use-after-free condition.

There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0631


TALOS-2018-0631 / CVE-2018-3966 is a use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader which can be abused to execute arbitrary code. This particular vulnerability leverages a saved reference to the 'this.dataObjects' object, triggering the use-after-free condition.


There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0632


TALOS-2018-0632 / CVE-2018-3967 is a use-after-free vulnerability found in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader that can be abused to execute arbitrary code. This particular vulnerability leverages a saved reference to the 'this.event.target' object, triggering the use-after-free condition.


There are a couple of different ways an adversary could leverage this attack including tricking a user to opening a specially crafted, malicious PDF or, if the browser plugin is enabled, the user could trigger the exploit by viewing the document in a web browser. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0660


TALOS-2018-0660/CVE-2018-3992 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader version 9.2.0.9297. A specially crafted PDF document can trigger a previously freed object in memory to be reused, resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker needs to trick the user into opening the malicious file to trigger this vulnerability. If the browser plugin extension is enabled, it can also be triggered by visiting a malicious site.

As a complete feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. A multipage PDF document can have JavaScript actions attached to "page open" and "page close" events. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which essentially frees numerous of used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute. Changing a page at a precise moment after the document is closed can lead to use-after-free condition. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0661


TALOS-2018-0661/CVE-2018-3993 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader version 9.2.0.9297. A specially crafted PDF document can trigger a previously freed object in memory to be reused, resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker needs to trick the user into opening the malicious file to trigger this vulnerability. If the browser plugin extension is enabled, it can also be triggered by visiting a malicious site.

This particular vulnerability lies in the way optional content groups (OCG) are manipulated. Saving an OCG and then accessing it's properties after the document is closed can trigger a use-after-free condition. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0662


TALOS-2018-0662/CVE-2018-3994 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader, version 9.2.0.9297. A specially crafted PDF document can trigger a previously freed object in memory to be reused, resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker needs to trick the user to open the malicious file to trigger this vulnerability. If the browser plugin extension is enabled, visiting a malicious site can also trigger the vulnerability.

As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. A multipage PDF document can have JavaScript actions attached to "page open" and "page close" events. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which frees numerous used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute. Changing a page at a precise moment after the document is closed can lead to use-after-free condition.

Calling `app.activeDocs[0].calculateNow()` while opening a page allocates an extra object on the heap. When the code in the open action for the whole document is executed, calling `app.activeDocs[0].importDataObject();` can then dereference a freed object, leading to use-after-free condition. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0663


TALOS-2018-0663/CVE-2018-3995 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader version 9.2.0.9297. A specially crafted PDF document can trigger a previously freed object in memory to be reused, resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker needs to trick the user to open the malicious file to trigger this vulnerability. If the browser plugin extension is enabled, visiting a malicious site can also trigger the vulnerability.

As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. A multipage PDF document can have JavaScript actions attached to "page open" and "page close" events. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which essentially frees numerous of used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute. Changing a page at the precise moment after the document is closed can lead to use-after-free condition.

This particular vulnerability lies in saving a reference to the `SignatureInfo` object by invoking the `signatureInfo` method of a form field. When the document is closed, objects are freed and a use-after-free condition occurs if a stale reference is accessed. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0664


TALOS-2018-0664/CVE-2018-3996 a use-after-free vulnerability in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader, version 9.2.0.9297. A specially crafted PDF document can trigger a previously freed object in memory to be reused, resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker needs to trick the user into opening the malicious file to trigger this vulnerability. A user could also trigger the vulnerability by visiting a malicious site while the browser plugin is enabled. As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. A multipage PDF document can have JavaScript actions attached to "page open" and "page close" events. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which essentially frees numerous of used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute. Changing a page at a precise moment after the document is closed can lead to use-after-free condition.

This particular vulnerability lies in invoking `isDefaultChecked` method of a field object with crafted object as argument, which can trigger a use-after-free condition. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


TALOS-2018-0665


TALOS-2018-0665/CVE-2018-3997 is a use-after-free vulnerability in the JavaScript engine of Foxit PDF Reader version 9.2.0.9297. A specially crafted PDF document can trigger a previously freed object in memory to be reused, resulting in arbitrary code execution. An attacker needs to trick the user to open the malicious file to trigger this vulnerability. A user could also trigger the vulnerability by visiting a malicious site while the browser plugin is enabled

As a feature-rich PDF reader, Foxit supports JavaScript for interactive documents and dynamic forms. A multipage PDF document can have Javascript actions attached to "page open" and "page close" events. When executing embedded JavaScript code, a document can be closed, which essentially frees numerous of used objects, but the JavaScript can continue to execute. Changing a page at a precise moment after the document is closed can lead to use-after-free condition.

If a reference to `SeedValue` object is saved by invoking `signatureGetSeedValue` method of a form field and the document is closed, objects are freed and accessing a stale reference results in a use-after-free condition. Full details of the vulnerability can be found here.


Coverage


The following Snort rules will detect exploitation attempts. Note that additional rules may be released at a future date, and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rule: 45158 - 45159, 45608 - 45609, 45652 - 45653, 45715 - 45716, 45823 - 45824, 46864 - 46865, 47727 - 47728


Vulnerability Spotlight: Adobe Acrobat Reader DC Collab reviewServer Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

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Discovered by Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos

Overview

Today, Cisco Talos is releasing details of a new vulnerability within Adobe Acrobat Reader DC. Adobe Acrobat Reader is the most popular and most feature-rich PDF reader. It has a large user base, is usually a default PDF reader on systems and integrates into web browsers as a plugin for rendering PDFs. As such, tricking a user into visiting a malicious web page or sending a specially crafted email attachment can be enough to trigger this vulnerability. The one method call required to trigger this vulnerability is privileged and can only be called from trusted functions or a trusted location. Additionally, the use-after-free condition is only triggered upon closing the application.

TALOS-2017-0623 - Adobe Acrobat Reader DC Collab reviewServer Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2018-12852)

Usage of specific JavaScript code embedded in a PDF file can lead to a use-after-free condition when opening a PDF document in Adobe Acrobat Reader DC 2018.011.20040. With careful memory manipulation, this can lead to arbitrary code execution. In order to trigger this vulnerability, the victim would need to open the malicious file or access a malicious web page.

Adobe Acrobat Reader DC supports embedded JavaScript code in the PDF to allow for interactive PDF forms This gives the potential attacker the ability to precisely control memory layout and poses additional attack surface. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Known vulnerable versions

Adobe Acrobat Reader DC 2018.011.20040

Coverage

The following Snort Rules will detect exploitation attempts. Note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rule: 47074 - 47045

BruCON Primer: 10 Years and Cisco Talos Talks

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Cisco Talos will have a significant presence at the 10th edition of BruCON, which kicks off this week. Below, you will find the presentations that Talos researchers will give, along with a brief overview of the topics they will discuss. We are fortunate to have multiple speakers presenting this year: Benny Ketelslegers, Jared Rittle and Lilith Wyatt.

BruCON Retro day opening speech

Presented by Benny Ketelslegers

BruCON was founded in 2008 by five security-minded Belgians working in the cybersecurity industry. What started as a herculean effort of a few people has now stabilized into one of the better European information security conferences that continues to grow each year. Benny, one of the founders, will go through the history of the con and highlight the key reasons it was able to survive through the first few years. We will be giving an overview of the security landscape in Belgium, why BruCON was founded and cover some of the highlights from the past 10 years.

This talk will take place on Oct. 3 at 10 a.m. during BruCON.

Process Control Through Counterfeit Comms

Presented by Jared Rittle

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are often relied on for the performance of critical process control functions in many different critical infrastructure sectors. Cisco Talos previously identified several vulnerabilities in the Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400 PLCs. These vulnerabilities included ones that could be leveraged to modify device configuration and ladder logic, write modified program data into the device's memory module, erase program data from the device's memory module, or conduct denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against affected devices. These vulnerabilities were disclosed to the manufacturer, with an update released to ensure that vulnerable devices could be updated to resolve these issues.

Jared Rittle of Cisco Talos will be presenting information regarding these vulnerabilities on Oct. 5 at 5:30 p.m.. Cisco Talos is also releasing a whitepaper that includes additional details related to how these vulnerabilities could be leveraged by attackers, the potential impacts they could have on affected devices, as well as mitigations that could be put in place to secure devices affected by these vulnerabilities. This whitepaper can be accessed here.

IoT RCE, a study with Disney

Presented by Lilith Wyatt

As desktop and server security keeps raising the baseline for successful exploitation, internet-of-things (IoT) devices are still stuck in the 1990s, despite their ubiquity in every home network. This, coupled with the ability to access them from anywhere, is creating a situation in which millions of households are left vulnerable, regardless of any network security posture — which is essentially a ticking time bomb.
These topics will be examined using the Circle with Disney— an internet monitoring device made by Disney — and a Foscam IP video camera as case studies. During the course of the vulnerability testing of these devices, more than 50 CVEs were discovered, out of which, discussion will focus on the more novel attack techniques seen within the Disney Circle, including:
  • SSL certificate-ttribute validation bypasses
  • SSID broadcasting injection
  • Use-between-Realloc memory corruption
  • Cloud routing abuse
During the course of the talk, there will be discussion regarding IoT device's use of traditionally offensive tools (ARP poisoning, backdoors, and beaconing) for central functionality.

Lilith Wyatt will present the information related to these vulnerabilities, including the specific details related to several use cases, on Oct. 5 at 3 p.m.

Vulnerability Spotlight: Google PDFium JBIG2 Image ComposeToOpt2WithRect Information Disclosure Vulnerability

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Discovered by Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos

Overview


Cisco Talos is releasing details of a new vulnerability in Google PDFium's JBIG2 library. An exploitable out-of-bounds read on the heap vulnerability exists in the JBIG2-parsing code in Google Chrome, version 67.0.3396.99. A specially crafted PDF document can trigger an out-of-bounds read, which can possibly lead to an information leak. That leak could be used as part of an exploit. An attacker needs to trick the user into visiting a malicious site to trigger the vulnerability.

In accordance with our coordinated disclosure policy, Cisco Talos has worked with Google to ensure that these issues have been resolved and that an update has been made available for affected users. It is recommended that this update is applied as quickly as possible to ensure that systems are no longer affected by this vulnerability.

Vulnerability Details

Google PDFium JBIG2 Image ComposeToOpt2WithRect Information Disclosure Vulnerability (TALOS-2018-0639 / CVE-2018-16076)

 

PDFium is an open-source PDF renderer developed by Google and used extensively in the Chrome browser, as well as other online services and standalone applications. This bug was fixed in the latest Git version, as well as the latest Chromium address sanitizer build available.

A heap buffer overflow is present in the code responsible for decoding a JBIG2 image stream. An attacker needs to provide a specific PDF that describes the JBIG2 image details in order to exploit this vulnerability. Detailed vulnerability information can be found here.

Known vulnerable versions


Google Chrome version 67.0.3396.99

https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2018/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html


Coverage


The following Snort Rules will detect exploitation attempts. Note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rules: 47340 - 47341

Threat Roundup Sept 28 - Oct 5

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Today, as we do every week, Talos is giving you a glimpse into the most prevalent threats we’ve observed this week — covering the dates between Sept. 28 and Oct. 5. As with previous roundups, this post isn’t meant to be an in-depth analysis. Instead, we will summarize the threats we’ve observed by highlighting key behavioral characteristics and indicators of compromise, and discussing how our customers are automatically protected from these threats.

As a reminder, the information provided for the following threats in this post is non-exhaustive and current as of the date of publication. Additionally, please keep in mind that IOC searching is only one part of threat hunting. Spotting a single IOC does not necessarily indicate maliciousness. Detection and coverage for the following threats is subject to updates, pending additional threat or vulnerability analysis. For the most current information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center, Snort.org, or ClamAV.net.

The most prevalent threats highlighted in this roundup are:

  • Win.Malware.Gandcrab-6706045-0
    Malware
    Gandcrab is ransomware that encrypts documents, photos, databases and other important files using the file extension ".GDCB", ".CRAB" or ".KRAB". Gandcrab is spread through both traditional spam campaigns, as well as multiple exploit kits, including Rig and Grandsoft.
     
  • Xls.Downloader.Valyria-6704496-0
    Downloader
    These variants of Valyria are malicious Excel files that contain embedded VBA macros used to distribute other malware.
     
  • Win.Dropper.Fqdq-6705253-0
    Dropper
    This dropper attempts to access the Firefox Password Manager local database, uses a temporary batch file to perform additional malicious activities and uploads files to remote servers. Additionally, it might inject code, read INI files or use Visual Basic scripts.
     
  • Win.Malware.Genkryptik-6704925-0
    Malware
    Win.Malware.Genkryptik is oftentimes a generic detection name for a Windows trojan. Some of the malicious activities that could be performed by these samples, without the user's knowledge, include: collecting system information, downloading and uploading files and dropping additional samples.
     
  • Win.Malware.Zusy-6704537-0
    Malware
    Zusy is a trojan that uses man-in-the-middle attacks to steal banking information. When executed, it injects itself into legitimate Windows processes such as "explorer.exe" and "winver.exe". The malware attempts to trick the user into entering their login information whenever they visit a financial services website.
     
  • Win.Malware.Razy-6703914-0
    Malware
    Razy is oftentimes a generic detection name for a Windows trojan. They collect sensitive information from the infected host and encrypt the data, and send it to a command and control (C2) server. Information collected might include screenshots. The samples modify auto-execute functionality by setting/creating a value in the registry for persistence.
     
  • Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6699885-0
    Malware
    These malicious Word documents contain embedded VBA macros, spawn new processes, drops files and remove Office resiliency keys.
     

Threats

Win.Malware.Gandcrab-6706045-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\3E\52C64B7E
    • Value Name: LanguageList
  • <HKCU>\CONTROL PANEL\DESKTOP
    • Value Name: Wallpaper
Mutexes
  • Global\8B5BAAB9E36E4507C5F5.lock
  • Global\XlAKFoxSKGOfSGOoSFOOFNOLPE
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • 50[.]63[.]202[.]89
  • 93[.]125[.]99[.]121
  • 137[.]74[.]238[.]33
  • 94[.]231[.]109[.]239
  • 185[.]135[.]88[.]105
  • 146[.]66[.]72[.]87
  • 87[.]236[.]16[.]31
  • 217[.]160[.]0[.]234
  • 69[.]73[.]180[.]151
  • 104[.]31[.]77[.]95
  • 171[.]244[.]34[.]167
  • 217[.]174[.]149[.]130
  • 70[.]40[.]197[.]96
  • 223[.]26[.]62[.]72
  • 80[.]77[.]123[.]23
  • 178[.]238[.]37[.]162
  • 51[.]68[.]50[.]168
  • 104[.]28[.]30[.]160
  • 67[.]227[.]236[.]96
  • 66[.]96[.]147[.]67
  • 179[.]188[.]11[.]34
  • 89[.]252[.]187[.]72
  • 194[.]58[.]56[.]95
  • 104[.]28[.]28[.]142
  • 104[.]27[.]163[.]241
  • 213[.]186[.]33[.]186
  • 107[.]178[.]113[.]162
  • 87[.]236[.]16[.]29
  • 188[.]165[.]53[.]185
  • 173[.]247[.]242[.]133
  • 77[.]104[.]144[.]25
  • 191[.]252[.]51[.]37
  • 202[.]43[.]45[.]181
  • 192[.]163[.]234[.]40
  • 217[.]160[.]0[.]27
  • 209[.]182[.]208[.]245
  • 94[.]73[.]148[.]18
  • 45[.]33[.]91[.]79
  • 87[.]236[.]19[.]135
  • 52[.]29[.]192[.]136
  • 178[.]33[.]233[.]202
  • 92[.]53[.]96[.]201
  • 186[.]202[.]153[.]158
  • 104[.]24[.]104[.]13
  • 213[.]186[.]33[.]3
  • 188[.]64[.]184[.]90
  • 95[.]213[.]173[.]173
  • 103[.]107[.]17[.]102
  • 103[.]27[.]238[.]31
  • 50[.]87[.]58[.]165
  • 104[.]27[.]186[.]113
  • 104[.]24[.]102[.]153
  • 77[.]104[.]171[.]238
  • 194[.]154[.]192[.]67
  • 87[.]236[.]16[.]41
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • www[.]litespeedtech[.]com
  • big-game-fishing-croatia[.]hr
  • www[.]lagouttedelixir[.]com
  • dreamhost[.]com
  • www[.]himmerlandgolf[.]dk
  • hanaglobalholding[.]com
  • top-22[.]ru
  • zaeba[.]co[.]uk
  • ispsystem[.]com
  • unnatimotors[.]in
  • www[.]macartegrise[.]eu
  • blokefeed[.]club
  • bellytobabyphotographyseattle[.]com
  • diadelorgasmo[.]cl
  • www[.]bgfc[.]hr
  • www[.]wash-wear[.]com
  • yourmine[.]ru
  • www[.]reg[.]ru
  • www[.]poketeg[.]com
  • boatshowradio[.]com
  • www[.]perfectfunnelblueprint[.]com
  • perovaphoto[.]ru
  • www[.]cakav[.]hu
  • www[.]billerimpex[.]com
  • evotech[.]lu
  • www[.]ismcrossconnect[.]com
  • help[.]dreamhost[.]com
  • www[.]fabbfoundation[.]gm
  • alem[.]be
  • cevent[.]net
  • mauricionacif[.]com
  • smbardoli[.]org
  • www[.]aco[.]dk
  • cyclevegas[.]com
  • lucides[.]co[.]uk
  • krasnaypolyana123[.]ru
  • hoteltravel2018[.]com
  • oceanlinen[.]com
  • 6chen[.]cn
  • koloritplus[.]ru
  • asl-company[.]ru
  • www[.]krishnagrp[.]com
  • test[.]theveeview[.]com
  • cdnjs[.]cloudflare[.]com
  • picusglancus[.]pl
  • bloghalm[.]eu
  • api[.]w[.]org
  • nesten[.]dk
  • simetribilisim[.]com
  • pp-panda74[.]ru
  • wpakademi[.]com
  • dna-cp[.]com
  • h5s[.]vn
  • bethel[.]com[.]ve
  • vjccons[.]com[.]vn
  • www[.]rment[.]in
  • marketisleri[.]com
  • www[.]byggekvalitet[.]dk
  • royal[.]by
  • gmpg[.]org
  • sherouk[.]com
  • tommarmores[.]com[.]br
  • graftedinn[.]us
  • www[.]mimid[.]cz
  • maxcdn[.]bootstrapcdn[.]com
  • panel[.]dreamhost[.]com
  • relectrica[.]com[.]mx
  • acbt[.]fr
  • damt7w3yoa0t2[.]cloudfront[.]net
  • topstockexpert[.]su
  • goodapd[.]website
  • www[.]n2plus[.]co[.]th
  • aurumwedding[.]ru
  • devdev[.]com[.]br
  • www[.]toflyaviacao[.]com[.]br
  • mimid[.]cz
  • nhs-foi[.]com
  • www[.]iyfipgun[.]com
  • wash-wear[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • %AppData%\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\UserData\MA3SBLRS\spid[1].xml
  • %UserProfile%\Videos\98b689db98b68e303c.lock
  • %UserProfile%\Start Menu\98b689db98b68e303c.lock
  • %UserProfile%\Start Menu\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • %UserProfile%\Videos\Sample Videos\98b689db98b68e303c.lock
  • %UserProfile%\Videos\Sample Videos\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \??\E:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2580483871-590521980-3826313501-500\98b689db98b68e303c.lock
  • \??\E:\$RECYCLE.BIN\S-1-5-21-2580483871-590521980-3826313501-500\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \??\E:\$RECYCLE.BIN\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \??\E:\98b689db98b68e303c.lock
  • \??\E:\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \MSOCache\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \PerfLogs\Admin\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \PerfLogs\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \Recovery\926583e2-ef64-11e4-beed-d6738078ad98\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \Recovery\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • \TEMP\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
  • %UserProfile%\Videos\SGMNP-DECRYPT.txt
File Hashes
  • 211484d0deda5cb97b16b27538b7d1d2c26af6ae3aac3c888085a0e8ddf2d8bd
  • 46b702851cb5c1df0a97d1ae9e3202316d36ef2195395a9bcc3699dd1d247733
  • 4e2ba4638d01c1473f0959fae6d31636456cde0ab995fa5f3fad1efc2cb7bf0e
  • 69fd1808c32fe3209f384fba8f79df13bec479e9b081f7edcf8720f6257f7dfe
  • 8b5c1735800d8ad69b535a863f4ae1941604b3e57261961e230a26b16b4b98ec
  • 9ec54c9d6ec39c34c8e011fcb10fb2ae5334d1d0632e63a61d94b36b9f9c8a9b
  • c394e7fa3604f5ee26419a913dbfeb0988d59bbf8ed25d852ebf62a48cc1688a
  • c4a126172b27777413ee4efcd0ce8656fbef52e81c984993af3fa63d5264cc8e
  • d81aa5dbd9272f9be6e4a0def514a9284220d88f219ac6fd908ab2c942b92cdc
  • d9129786346cfa0aa07a1c82d4bcb79a977c7c8e1a052916a34b6cde4c09c006
  • e41697a99da83a32bf8a56f993123fbfaef378d5e6f61286a272536fe10b6d35
  • e50a28068fcae51a609946fad1637a5dbfbda8add88063ddb117cb8e0cfc4a74
  • e8502aa65a4da371c0e378b245374af7340b809140a5d2e3bc3bfa67a92a2bde
  • eb9347f0fbbb675ecc61beb1f2be8721871e203357b124ad9858037a641709f5
  • f77825b0388a6220521219030ad70bdb6fcd3216a590d092ec4aa22a506a17b6

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid


Umbrella


Xls.Downloader.Valyria-6704496-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS\ZONEMAP
    • Value Name: UNCAsIntranet
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\INTERNET SETTINGS\ZONEMAP
    • Value Name: AutoDetect
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WISP\MULTITOUCH
    • Value Name: MultiTouchEnabled
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WISP\PEN\PERSIST\0\1
    • Value Name: HidCursorName
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WINDEFEND
    • Value Name: DeleteFlag
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\WINDEFEND
    • Value Name: Start
Mutexes
  • Local\10MU_ACB10_S-1-5-5-0-57527
  • Local\10MU_ACBPIDS_S-1-5-5-0-57527
  • Global\316D1C7871E00
  • {773F1B9A-35B9-4E95-83A0-A210F2DE3B37}-Default
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • 78[.]47[.]139[.]102
  • 107[.]180[.]25[.]0
  • 103[.]110[.]91[.]118
  • 89[.]163[.]224[.]250
  • 199[.]249[.]223[.]62
  • 185[.]220[.]101[.]12
  • 89[.]27[.]96[.]42
  • 208[.]113[.]131[.]196
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • dallasmediationlawyer[.]com
  • myexternalip[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\character.exe
  • %AppData%\mssert\chasactes.exe
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\const_cast.bat
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\whzxixx5.jdj.ps1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\xgxfy2dc.eju.psm1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\21iyllij.ncz.psm1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\erifm5li.lo3.ps1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\wmez5d0g.r0g.ps1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\gs0jrz4i.yd2.psm1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\qgh0kqvv.ce5.ps1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\tkzdlipn.odo.psm1
File Hashes
  • 0276895b76757b5b2726c1c2fbb50d98040dc2dc46aedff1e5b9709f168b4a8d
  • 0f792637a859a3c2919e1e45a9500e1bdf2b5f4e07bfc4d8b5e24cf7c8003e5e
  • 1114fd2ee387df04c4e7ed0bb6d088b220e893c8a1ee07386977c7369681e5d3
  • 1c2f39f6a608c70b16a79ed4cfb228c412852caac8a8b8bafc4e0819d038aa2c
  • 2ca6d57dcfacd0f59f8b390ccbf138b557b8e95a157a53de6fe864c5eafbcf80
  • 4682a95f9ed32657ee61b7aec758ab6bbdc17a52e2812e1372b3b2a9776cadc1
  • 655f60c338658334723310c79033b26daa207b61fd89ebaf4abbed93802c65be
  • 672aac7a017a8417608dfe687fa4023fdd1e90a7d77f6e1d9b035a070c9d9c40
  • 6ff12e83f44e19de6515c03108fccfd98abd3a70bbab1088171954a3c6113d3b
  • a407d2cfb849a1822895fb5770db7c24b707422da3a193e7d8f5d9e39bfb3896
  • ccbac43307cd046f896283deac0341351b5dc83e6be5cb2292a0c28cdfd34650
  • dafd70b7b82551b0feb905f8d466d2b02784ce6e5d5c2b8d6d00e82b27487ae0
  • dbf3533e970aacc291d0342289943605537407df18217182ca39d52a8c9f8970

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid



Umbrella

Win.Dropper.Fqdq-6705253-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\3E\52C64B7E
    • Value Name: LanguageList
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\NETWORK\{4D36E972-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\{9EB90D23-C5F9-4104-85A8-47DD7F6C4070}\CONNECTION
    • Value Name: PnpInstanceID
Mutexes
  • 3749282D282E1E80C56CAE5A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • N/A
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • baxishop[.]ro
Files and or directories created
  • %AppData%\D282E1\1E80C5.lck
  • %AllUsersProfile%\Microsoft\Vault\AC658CB4-9126-49BD-B877-31EEDAB3F204\Policy.vpol
  • \PC*\MAILSLOT\NET\NETLOGON
  • \lsass
  • %AppData%\D282E1
  • \samr
File Hashes
  • 030290f026a913226735bc017a37997180f130b9ce1fdc3b990e050aea4bc39e
  • 07abd686b7cda16b61c65d82cb72f464e2ea31bb8bb165f01bbcfa693f1bd22a
  • 1258790e008879340d7cd8e6b303e25183345a05d81b6583164f0a690323405b
  • 12963b31f9719d9333f6cbdb46426c32179bba4a31976b094d192588eb4439ff
  • 2627bd09fd4886f83a7ca589518523606b581ad026968f3d013e1cfb221f7811
  • 2c18a46ea35314f065b21e151d37787cfa5b7696207226ca80f7732176659ee9
  • 30a901d40309ac1e42e98ad59044e1e1f97f985ca397628e8f0deb8f67f39d1f
  • 31ef4c98208464b43dd337b92cba0cfa05d0924ebc732e0b1ee88120495f503c
  • 34f159a5b3ee64cbe520c18e9abd66be61b583dad385bbec9cadf054942827da
  • 35c1410cfb084bb4f4ef5a7c3d92c7b78ddd33849864e41f22e09f5b1c3997b2
  • 3a69eddc3ab09e947703dbfd7e279e9e6e867190c9f72f395833fe94a1b6903a
  • 4688f04b2498695705ea718ba724e9f0c04d92d09d75505f7fa1b1ad19bfe795
  • 4e79a2473921ee6132c3e73f9b4de0395ec350cb476981cf2cb19171034f9405
  • 56979370107aeffca2fa5ad915f454e33ced1a5c6518dbc01ed15689b92e83dd
  • 582f2175b65814e7558fca9ebc7e1a6f97402ce3079f43ece47fdc17c3f7324e
  • 5f83ff3b7d094547fd00dacabe669e389bdd04af09dcbc7790f29a63f797a00f
  • 6448bc9787a96f76cc6716294a204df6d1cbd6db9cc441abc78b31161529e00f
  • 7a2868174590c11d2f95794260792700a1fd567b5315702decfd1cd6611ed0d5
  • 8b7a4bc0f2ea0f3e54b0cea9fa2928ddd0a85aa80a64071985cf95301c0d5ac3
  • 9030a6efd1e15d5e78b727700863ab45b667a7c532761b3a148aa222f7e17b87
  • 946de8d2685ded47c74e4b7c9490e8961598462a87be7ca5bef22693745f7cfa
  • 951860ee7f7283a3b238cbfdb6e161c09fcb6a2b7975bb142412c442fd2590fd
  • 95b99dd7dd7814724287c89e2435aa65cc82e91c5aabd453be1a0532d50bd936
  • 96397b26ba4ee4244704c2cadd71c3d3d4c12e988f6de1d695f3602432bd94b3
  • 9c5acd9297928707ed7e472e9316b125b55b2cd98870aaa4b4630dcd0fece734

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid

Win.Malware.Genkryptik-6704925-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\TCPIP\PARAMETERS
    • Value Name: DhcpNameServer
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\TCPIP\PARAMETERS\INTERFACES\{9EB90D23-C5F9-4104-85A8-47DD7F6C4070}
    • Value Name: DhcpNameServer
Mutexes
  • !IECompat!Mutex
  • !PrivacIE!SharedMem!Mutex
  • Local\VERMGMTBlockListFileMutex
  • Local\!BrowserEmulation!SharedMemory!Mutex
  • Local\URLBLOCK_DOWNLOAD_MUTEX
  • Local\URLBLOCK_HASHFILESWITCH_MUTEX
  • {5312EE61-79E3-4A24-BFE1-132B85B23C3A}
  • {66D0969A-1E86-44CF-B4EC-3806DDDA3B5D}
  • IsoScope_1e0_ConnHashTable<480>_HashTable_Mutex
  • IsoScope_1e0_IESQMMUTEX_0_303
  • IsoScope_1e0_IESQMMUTEX_0_331
  • IsoScope_1e0_IESQMMUTEX_0_274
  • Local\URLBLOCK_FILEMAPSWITCH_MUTEX_480
  • IsoScope_708_ConnHashTable<1800>_HashTable_Mutex
  • IsoScope_708_IESQMMUTEX_0_303
  • IsoScope_708_IESQMMUTEX_0_331
  • Local\URLBLOCK_FILEMAPSWITCH_MUTEX_1800
  • IsoScope_708_IESQMMUTEX_0_274
  • IsoScope_4b4_IESQMMUTEX_0_274
  • IsoScope_f8_IESQMMUTEX_0_274
  • IsoScope_20c_ConnHashTable<524>_HashTable_Mutex
  • IsoScope_20c_IESQMMUTEX_0_303
  • IsoScope_20c_IESQMMUTEX_0_331
  • IsoScope_4b4_ConnHashTable<1204>_HashTable_Mutex
  • IsoScope_4b4_IESQMMUTEX_0_303
  • IsoScope_4b4_IESQMMUTEX_0_331
  • IsoScope_20c_IESQMMUTEX_0_274
  • Local\URLBLOCK_FILEMAPSWITCH_MUTEX_524
  • IsoScope_f8_ConnHashTable<248>_HashTable_Mutex
  • IsoScope_f8_IESQMMUTEX_0_303
  • IsoScope_f8_IESQMMUTEX_0_331
  • Local\URLBLOCK_FILEMAPSWITCH_MUTEX_248
  • IsoScope_6e4_IESQMMUTEX_0_274
  • IsoScope_6e4_ConnHashTable<1764>_HashTable_Mutex
  • IsoScope_6e4_IESQMMUTEX_0_303
  • IsoScope_6e4_IESQMMUTEX_0_331
  • Local\URLBLOCK_FILEMAPSWITCH_MUTEX_1764
  • IsoScope_4e8_IESQMMUTEX_0_274
  • IsoScope_4e8_ConnHashTable<1256>_HashTable_Mutex
  • IsoScope_4e8_IESQMMUTEX_0_303
  • IsoScope_4e8_IESQMMUTEX_0_331
  • Local\URLBLOCK_FILEMAPSWITCH_MUTEX_1256
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 13[.]107[.]21[.]200
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • ryiwuehwskosuqhs[.]com
  • goldenmemb[.]website
  • dolikulooospo[.]fun
Files and or directories created
  • %LocalAppData%Low\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Services\search_{0633EE93-D776-472f-A0FF-E1416B8B2E3A}.ico
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01tmp.log
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\1NSKV6K6\dnserror[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\1NSKV6K6\httpErrorPagesScripts[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\6YL4T24G\errorPageStrings[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\6YL4T24G\httpErrorPagesScripts[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\7V3XNPL2\NewErrorPageTemplate[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\7V3XNPL2\errorPageStrings[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\NewErrorPageTemplate[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\dnserror[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V010000F.log
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF4B1ABF6D6A9DC6E3.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF88BBAB8557CDD7E3.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\1NSKV6K6\errorPageStrings[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\1NSKV6K6\suggestions[2].en-US
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\6YL4T24G\NewErrorPageTemplate[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\7V3XNPL2\dnserror[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\7V3XNPL2\favicon[2].ico
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\1NSKV6K6\favicon[1].png
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\1NSKV6K6\favicon[2].png
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\6YL4T24G\views[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\7V3XNPL2\favicon[1].ico
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DFDEB0FC636A1346E9.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DFEBFBFB87C6F7EC1B.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DFFC172A87F8554CB4.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF81A97BC70E347BD0.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\httpErrorPagesScripts[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF8AA772D245BBB59D.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF90B11BDCE6092786.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF9FFAF3D7E7318657.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\1NSKV6K6\NewErrorPageTemplate[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\7V3XNPL2\httpErrorPagesScripts[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\NewErrorPageTemplate[2]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\dnserror[2]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\errorPageStrings[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\errorPageStrings[2]
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\SSZWDDXW\httpErrorPagesScripts[2]
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF5DDD3B43947F7CEA.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\6YL4T24G\dnserror[1]
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DFB15BBE1A2AFF7D7E.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF1D30A03829232972.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DF38E2C66D6383AD19.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DFCE77235CFE7E5202.TMP
File Hashes
  • 060707050140235807d6e6ac6933fa26cf0c230d68f574b880e99a699bdf506a
  • 088a6e8da14dbeab941702b1515b85486544dffc83885112b95997257f8d32d5
  • 0dfc771e0fbdf05facc54643341dfce97b745efe13867b01049bc977624d14b2
  • 0e21eb1c5f15689329bc6d46d78eb7d0f4eccc6fb8da4f41d17e6205ae7a847b
  • 0f71ba5f0fbba5d9810a4f816c5ebe1d545c4c65b34c180c769c2cd3467b0737
  • 130649d3f09197d1c2e895cc06fd9ecd6feb2e663562a6b99d95ae4ce66eddb8
  • 139ac3f5d2e5351c0edcd0edb384d0a75e482e8007724f181c7a4204f5895ad9
  • 13c3313b910f18431ea183b00632deacd266561a73bcf837f4b46f1f73b31bcd
  • 24b6c693551ed33b55d7ce6baae96dcca9e3cb55e9b94637d5ba59edc109d402
  • 27cec90ae8c84a79dd2ebb2928152bdea1b07cab3b2f1ad98ed8fb3f17cc339b
  • 28b54e5cf1be89766c177bc7f4c8692abec0bb4bdf299a59709d10120f7bc205
  • 29b845365404070e98840dcd74eb3c23919b0990b14bd0905b0921220f8b4bb9
  • 2c3fad4307c0739c336e50ec670b61d00029d2a2be260676419f883835ce8818
  • 337ad107eb3e1fc497af4b3f6006e12ae74a55d6535f28a67c9b231807e15f24
  • 3394d5ec6ba4c548289008cbfea8238318af52d51e8e2110b5060635425db74c
  • 378a4e27208c7fee9c7ac33d11d8872db902fe5242aceabba11343bf11a95155
  • 3a136b2b6df645c3e6b3c0febb821a5dda5bcb4bd35f674fb33aa10684b58004
  • 3c4e171d1f0b29b6f40f8bdf6af0c1161b092591c453c66734f4c6f54a0ac36f
  • 3ec415b8f411c2004892c7dedcd25e4683d0f0fded754c8b9a0f784f087dddcf
  • 420c05993a014331992918e89dda914851c0e31a2e196446309e3da07dc0c31a
  • 43d9e51c98400b09bc499f0e2857e2b797254167c29c9d2234f6506d7cf7f98e
  • 4ae9179659e2ba267b87478ea0f48c6c1caba252b4d2bcdfdc4b6ba873028d87
  • 542b5b23123a0a71d79181adeda4edfff6b91cdaf0068aafc55ee03bdc928ab5
  • 5bbc6d14ed5d408d0c7bb115853dff092c236517223c14b92c709a7ffa2c5742
  • 5cc63a68be8b7ea9feca940e7b038ebca417f421a0b70c17d3e6ebfca4212e16

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid



Umbrella

Win.Malware.Zusy-6704537-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\3E\52C64B7E
    • Value Name: LanguageList
  • <HKLM>\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\CONTROL\NETWORK\{4D36E972-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\{9EB90D23-C5F9-4104-85A8-47DD7F6C4070}\CONNECTION
    • Value Name: PnpInstanceID
  • <HKCU>\Software\Microsoft\RAS AutoDial
Mutexes
  • DBWinMutex
  • NtHack
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 139[.]196[.]204[.]190
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • www[.]bilibili[.]com
  • wpa[.]qq[.]com
  • bbs[.]nt47[.]com
  • www[.]nt47[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • N/A
File Hashes
  • 00b657fa1270930f868fcd06c38af4b1514baa727c0db576e50340cc2f1c49dc
  • 0f6f850198e9afb8ddfe5552dad5ae6151c3cdf41f5ed8964a1e46ce62ea0d2b
  • 1bf8402a3da8797a130c528ff38fcca42403a5e878943d8dbaec420433c55edf
  • 2c0996f013b00833a28d1612acc545a66264b613e7127738ccf3536ddb04501c
  • 41cd6b708c56e1bad9b185ab09de02efd1f57d7c6691a9910d00b18489e59ec7
  • 4733b5c290c00ca10bc72c248d6a014c6bf5fe21b92592b941cfdd8ac6870610
  • 55099d0d5b7f5f677e431ebaf4c9a71877ab7b10887cb027ac78540ba1631779
  • 680e98f78b16e05b2f55e1432f8553341cfd02ece47cedca652a04e1f4c901cf
  • 6f496ef1284e79d93693374672e416d46b55c6590f8ab7737303b12f7316c2dd
  • 9085e78cbbf63b30c42a4801cee1b67fa41f4c4308d0f163c3d39d7f76c00bf8
  • 98e0df2e9cf8ba02d05cdc1bdea0cccc861855197f2a009f4a8fed152770b499
  • c19b9d8770e3619d832401aa7bc385bbf7e239d0397febbb441621efbb539f72
  • cca199364abfb50ec1dd467035fd2c637056abac9f8351393111dcdce8243e38
  • d346a3d9a4be88b2e6fe2b78b391efa47d4de3c9acb23aeb31c0b0e1868d9817
  • da9e5e6a5379284ca1b4e9be680bbecdcbca2378d8d8ae9e76e5601ba4fd9dcc
  • eba22d087a40a79daa58a95e6337f53cf98885400019ad9e8417bb4ce2f2c8ea

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid

Win.Malware.Razy-6703914-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
    • Value Name: internat.exe
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS\CURRENTVERSION\RUN
    • Value Name: system
  • <HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\ACTIVE SETUP\INSTALLED COMPONENTS\{4LW407K6-M06A-64Y6-80K0-13CK6KK8U041}
    • Value Name: StubPath
Mutexes
  • -
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 217[.]12[.]210[.]23
  • 82[.]205[.]63[.]221
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • extreme33[.]dns1[.]us
  • mdformo[.]ddns[.]net
  • mdformo1[.]ddns[.]net
Files and or directories created
  • N/A
File Hashes
  • 00e3f5ffeb38495cefce0f1c9522743764adf1ee6ce51b91c9c4726726562a12
  • 01a7bdfdc6502db6bd237fcbc64596d8f76052e942c2c87e897f1ae786b7cac2
  • 02c5fa1012b9cf0d46801cadcc4fe6814b4f75d50104e948031d00ff3ca7b93c
  • 035f91568ca2bad43ce3fde98a2ae0418821e5f558c62b919c786c3b07bc0fe2
  • 03970d185025e7e226c704b5bcd13de89730677345d3d57081d07895966567d4
  • 052862be7afd84bbd167be8b83918d828608b35e1423600571747e67e66dbd16
  • 055865fb005e3969e6d9e7feba2e81a8bedbe3048bf2a9cd3a9fbfe8ea6076e5
  • 063e213ee0ecae95132a3cea557203b782de3c63b753fbd405ed670e83fbf573
  • 07912d5cd0bf4ef89355a76c1fc36497e90333111b127dcf07d76cbc8ab76838
  • 081fbe8f1c01676f9765ff7742b5d348433e2fd073136355100fe9f054140e6a
  • 08627d7fbb6313bcdd42ac88152b71f4700dadf0446fb985b269c614bdd3f9af
  • 08c257d2e5938dc6539b463ba0689982b79c112c8ad0aaf1be247726622ea487
  • 092b86ef5f0e69ac5e1d554304189d289f27534fa4c7835ad4137f380a25979b
  • 09c9b81d40f3c97876eaad0f29d7e9694c58c9a9cc4dc38b167611ecfbda3d75
  • 0a032738a8ffc58b6cdce62ef209b247e008f597b6955d87da71e1654da970ef
  • 0a77d603959b51f81cd2b3b27342be0fa4248586ba0121779f1a9959fd701d11
  • 0aa93c8240a9c593d6a8d5c226d4f0b7ac033cef70b39524281c52d92a97fb0a
  • 0afde5386ca8587bca67577727f02c3e71b883b7b5fc72e25a0d542f6c5819c8
  • 0d794619980f35738bd57712d170542d6d8ff58248d21529754a0881c0b139a4
  • 0f4fc18209bbb1d979cb504b807142e1a24aa8ee831e33ce8825a5bd350096fa
  • 0ffca4c710e5af160e813f686181131c963123caaeeea9762f86296822b8c883
  • 10427e9a0ee1b4e3d349d61839e1f09cb86b2a68d23e41933127dd5ce2da0134
  • 1343648c8b4748294191cfdca4b4881a57cee96db4051530c514e7c56e1152e3
  • 1495bb27a646d27162b28bce50ebf25abc5182e7417ced315f1b93060f7e99a0
  • 17983b493cd46b604ef3846516da1cda1628ec855b896be8b54a9558ae83058c

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid



Umbrella


Doc.Malware.Emooodldr-6699885-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCR>\LOCAL SETTINGS\MUICACHE\3E\52C64B7E
    • Value Name: LanguageList
  • <HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\PRINT\PRINTERS\Canon PIXMA MG2520\PrinterDriverData
Mutexes
  • Global\552FFA80-3393-423d-8671-7BA046BB5906
  • Local\ZonesCacheCounterMutex
  • Local\ZonesLockedCacheCounterMutex
  • Global\PowerShell_CommandAnalysis_Lock_S-1-5-21-2580483871-590521980-3826313501-500
  • Global\MTX_MSO_AdHoc1_S-1-5-21-2580483871-590521980-3826313501-500
  • Global\MTX_MSO_Formal1_S-1-5-21-2580483871-590521980-3826313501-500
  • Local\10MU_ACB10_S-1-5-5-0-57527
  • Local\10MU_ACBPIDS_S-1-5-5-0-57527
  • Local\WinSpl64To32Mutex_e162_0_3000
  • Local\MSCTF.Asm.MutexDefault1
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • N/A
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness.
  • q0fpkblizxfe1l[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{B106E8EE-597B-49CA-A6A4-5BA8ABCC8F6A}.tmp
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRS{43E9ADDD-30D5-47E4-98B0-7E3A5536CACC}.tmp
  • %UserProfile%\Documents\20180928
  • %UserProfile%\924.exe
  • %SystemDrive%\TEMP\~$8241024f69edc258237f01170ea088fd5064c5908267e943f97bc9e2a6ea1d.doc
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\CVR41E8.tmp
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\~DFD053DCDB50AFFE51.TMP
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.Word\~WRF{0EF83731-611B-4C55-980D-4D5CFC5BF353}.tmp
  • %AppData%\Microsoft\Office\Recent\5f8241024f69edc258237f01170ea088fd5064c5908267e943f97bc9e2a6ea1d.LNK
  • \TEMP\~$8241024f69edc258237f01170ea088fd5064c5908267e943f97bc9e2a6ea1d.doc
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\bdmwft0z.slp.ps1
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\tjkn23yi.53a.psm1
  • %UserProfile%\Documents\20180928\PowerShell_transcript.PC.ceUgAgR5.20180928074741.txt
File Hashes
  • 06f0ec25e8b014b407402207afa8b6c0db494ad270d910534399c2137204e81b
  • 0a8d4f2ac74485345284950b158da4be071633f33b0c7b9fa18d1f3e4d28732e
  • 292b28d2f08fbd08ee8f1c2ed6f765b08c883031c0fae8dd84480ba0e1ca940d
  • 3371fc7b0cf2d389571002c3ca26c9268edc373b79486e47bd6c349120f560c2
  • 33d078881456e3b930c480803902fa28142b17c8550f3932e7cf4a1df0eb9213
  • 567fe3794a9eec27697ae0634861d284279261880887f60a7374c6cbe63b7674
  • 5f8241024f69edc258237f01170ea088fd5064c5908267e943f97bc9e2a6ea1d
  • 91f0264ea76628c6b8825f358cd9cb8e1255604108fc059e0ac283d49c0dd852
  • 933f5c822937fdec9325d1c99c5e0a5fda92296ef7c51ce7cd2dfc72bbe95b82
  • cf8f98b1adf802ed2b24345161a38c4cfa499b36f17b0466a1da74edce84ba4b
  • e469ba3bad870a5e7596035f69f2ba4cbb849cbdf9a8019890ccdea02c60e4d6
  • f368d4a10770c42316d9c1024a0894b85048020526be03b2e824165b5b66e978
  • f88ef62f2342f4d1105cfe85395b735efd3f0308b79551944983ce245d425510

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid



Umbrella


Vulnerability in the Intel Unified Shader compiler for the Intel Graphics Accelerator

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Vulnerabilities discovered by Piotr Bania of Cisco Talos

Talos is disclosing a pointer corruption vulnerability in the Intel Unified Shader compiler for the Intel Graphics Accelerator.


Overview

In order for the graphics to be produced, the graphics accelerators need to process the OpenGL scripts into actual graphics. That process is named "shader compilation." On the Intel Graphics accelerator, this is done inside the igdusc64 dynamic linked library (DLL), and this is where the vulnerability exists.


TALOS-2018-0533 - Intel Unified Shader Compiler for Intel Graphics Accelerator Pointer Corruption

An exploitable pointer corruption vulnerability exists in the Intel's Unified Shader Compiler for IntelⓇ Graphics Accelerator, version 10.18.14.4889. A specially crafted pixel shader can cause a pointer corruption, that if exploited successfully, may lead to code execution. An attacker can trigger the vulnerability by supplying a specially crafted shader file, either in binary or text form. The vulnerability can be triggered from a VMware guest affecting VMware host (potentially causing VMware to crash or a guest-to-host escape). Under specific circumstances, WebGL may also be an attack vector.

CVE: CVE-2018-12152

A full technical advisory is available here.

TALOS-2018-0568 - Intel Unified Shader Compiler for Intel Graphics Accelerator Remote Denial of Service

An exploitable denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the Intel's Unified Shader Compiler for Intel Graphics Accelerator (10.18.14.4889). An attacker can provide a specially crafted shader file (either in binary or text form) to trigger this vulnerability. This vulnerability can be triggered from VMware guest and the vmware-vmx.exe process crash on the host.

CVE: CVE-2018-12153

A full technical advisory is available here.

TALOS-2018-0579 - Intel Unified Shader Compiler for Intel Graphics Accelerator Remote Denial of Service

An exploitable pointer corruption vulnerability exists in the Intel's Unified Shader Compiler for Intel Graphics Accelerator, version 10.18.14.4889. A specially crafted pixel shader can cause an infinite loop, leading to a denial of service.

The vulnerability can be triggered from a VMware guest affecting VMware host where the vmware-vmx.exe will become unresponsive while consuming CPU resources.

CVE: CVE-2018-12154

A full technical advisory is available here.

Discussion

Vulnerabilities that may lead to virtual machine guest-to-host escape are especially insidious, as they may expose more than just the targeted system. The possibility of a remote attack vector through the WebGL increases the risk posed by this vulnerability, has it provides a bigger landscape of attack.

Coverage

The following Snort IDs have been released to detect these vulnerabilities:
45752 - 45753, 46173 - 46174, 46388 - 46389

Microsoft Patch Tuesday — October 18: Vulnerability disclosures and Snort coverage

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Microsoft released its monthly security update today, disclosing a variety of vulnerabilities in several of its products. The latest Patch Tuesday covers 49 vulnerabilities, 12 of which are rated "critical," 34 that are rated "important,” two that are considered to have “moderate” severity and one that’s rated as “low.”

The advisories cover bugs in the Chakra scripting engine, the Microsoft Edge internet browser and the Microsoft Office suite of products, among other software.

This update also includes a critical advisory that covers updates to the Microsoft Office suite of products.

Critical vulnerabilities

Microsoft has disclosed 12 critical vulnerabilities this month, which we will highlight below.


CVE-2018-8491, CVE-2018-8460 and CVE-2018-8509 are memory corruption vulnerabilities in the Internet Explorer web browser. In both cases, an attacker needs to trick the user into visiting a specially crafted, malicious website that can corrupt the browser’s memory, allowing for remote code execution in the context of the current user. This class of vulnerabilities is especially dangerous since a spam campaign can be used to trick the user while hiding the attack from network protections with HTTPS.

CVE-2018-8473 is a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft Edge. The bug lies in the way the web browser accesses objects in memory. An attacker could trick a user into visiting a malicious website or take advantage of a website that accepts user-created content or advertisements in order to exploit this vulnerability.

CVE-2018-8513, CVE-2018-8500, CVE-2018-8511, CVE-2018-8505 and CVE-2018-8510 are memory corruption vulnerabilities in the Chakra scripting engine that affects a variety of products. In all cases, an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to execute code on the system in the context of the current user and completely take over the system. This class of vulnerabilities is especially dangerous since a spam campaign can be used to trick the user while hiding the attack from network protections with HTTPS.

CVE-2018-8494 is a remote code execution vulnerability that exists when the MSXML parser in Microsoft XML Core Services processes user input. An attacker can exploit this bug by invoking MSXML through a web browser on a specially crafted website. The user also needs to convince the user to open the web page.

CVE-2018-8490 and CVE-2018-8489 are remote code execution vulnerabilities in the Windows Hyper-V hypervisor. The bugs lie in the way the host server on Hyper-V fails to properly validate input from an authenticated user on a guest operating system. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by running a specially crafted application on a guest operating system that could cause the Hyper-V host operating system to execute arbitrary code.

Important vulnerabilities

There are also 34 important vulnerabilities in this release. We would like to specifically highlight 22 of them.

CVE-2018-8512 is a security feature bypass vulnerability in Microsoft Edge. The web browser improperly validates certain specially crafted documents in the Edge Content Security Policy (CSP), which could allow an attacker to trick a user into loading a malicious page.

CVE-2018-8448 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in the Microsoft Exchange email server. The bug exists in the way that Exchange Outlook Web Access improperly handles web requests. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by performing script or content injection attacks that trick the user into disclosing sensitive information. They could also trick the user into providing login credentials via social engineering in an email or chat client.

CVE-2018-8453 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in the Windows operating system that occurs when the Win32k component improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker could obtain the ability to run arbitrary code in kernel mode by logging onto the system and then run a specially crafted application.

CVE-2018-8484 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in the DirectX Graphics Kernel driver that exists when the driver improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker could log onto the system and execute a specially crafted application to exploit this bug and run processes in an elevated context.

CVE-2018-8423 is a remote code execution vulnerability in the Microsoft JET Database Engine that could allow an attacker to take control of an affected system. A user must open or import a specially crafted Microsoft JET Database Engine file on the system in order to exploit this bug. They could also trick a user into opening a malicious file via email.

CVE-2018-8502 is a security feature bypass vulnerability in Microsoft Excel when the software fails to properly handle objects in protected view. An attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user if they convince the user to open a specially crafted, malicious Excel document via email or on a web page. This bug cannot be exploited if the user opens the Excel file in just the preview pane.

CVE-2018-8501 is a security feature bypass vulnerability in Microsoft PowerPoint. The bug exists when the software improperly handles objects in protected view. An attacker can execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user if they convince the user to open a specially crafted PowerPoint file. This bug cannot be exploited if the user only opens the file in preview mode.

CVE-2018-8432 is a remote code execution vulnerability that lies in the way Microsoft Graphics Components handles objects in memory. A user would have to open a specially crafted file in order to trigger this bug.

CVE-2018-8504 is a security feature bypass vulnerability in the Microsoft Word word processor. There is a flaw in the way the software handles objects in protected view. An attacker could obtain the ability to arbitrarily execute code in the context of the current user if they convince the user to open a malicious Word document. The bug cannot be triggered if the user opens the file in preview mode.

CVE-2018-8427 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Microsoft Graphics Components. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by tricking the user into opening a specially crafted file, which would expose memory layout.

CVE-2018-8480 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in the Microsoft SharePoint collaborative platform. The bug lies in the way the software improperly sanitizes a specially crafted web request to an affected SharePoint server. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted request to an affected SharePoint server.

CVE-2018-8518, CVE-2018-8488 and CVE-2018-8498 are elevation of privilege vulnerabilities in the Microsoft SharePoint Server. An attacker can exploit these bugs by sending a specially crafted request to an affected SharePoint server, allowing them to carry out cross-site scripting attacks and execute code in the context of the current user.

CVE-2018-8333 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Filter Management that exists when the program improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker needs to log onto the system and delete a specially crafted file in order to exploit this bug, which could lead to them gaining the ability to execute code in the context of an elevated user.

CVE-2018-8411 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability that exists when the NFTS file system improperly checks access. An attacker needs to log onto the system to exploit this bug and then run a specially crafted application, which could lead to the attacker running processes in an elevated context.

CVE-2018-8320 is a security feature bypass vulnerability that exists in the DNS Global Blocklist feature. An attacker who exploits this bug could redirect traffic to a malicious DNS endpoint.

CVE-2018-8492 is a security bypass vulnerability in the Device Guard Windows feature that could allow an attacker to inject malicious code into Windows PowerShell. An attacker needs direct access to the machine in order to exploit this bug, and then inject malicious code into a script that is trusted by the Code Integrity policy. The malicious code would then run with the same access level as the script, and bypass the integrity policy.

CVE-2018-8329 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Linux on Windows. The bug lies in the way Linux improperly handles objects in memory. An attacker can completely take control of an affected system after logging onto the system and running a specially crafted application.

CVE-2018-8497 is an elevation of privilege vulnerability that exists in the way the Windows Kernel handles objects in memory. A locally authenticated attacker can exploit this bug by running a specially crafted application.

CVE-2018-8495 is a remote code execution vulnerability that exists in the way Windows Shell handles URIs. An attacker needs to convince the user to visit a specially crafted website on Microsoft Edge in order to exploit this vulnerability.

CVE-2018-8413 is a remote code execution vulnerability that exists when “Windows Theme API” improperly decompresses files. A victim can exploit this bug by convincing the user to open a specially crafted file via an email, chat client message or on a malicious web page, allowing the attacker to execute code in the context of the current user.

Other important vulnerabilities:

Moderate vulnerabilities

Of the two moderate vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft, Talos believes one is worth highlighting.

CVE-2010-3190 is a remote code execution vulnerability in the way that certain applications built using Microsoft Foundation Classes handle the loading of DLL files. An attacker could take complete control of an affected system by exploiting this vulnerability. At the time this bug was first disclosed, Exchange Server was not identified as an in-scope product, which is why this release highlights a flaw from 2010.

The other moderate vulnerability is CVE-2018-8533.

Low vulnerability

There is also one low-rated vulnerability, which Talos wishes to highlight.

CVE-2018-8503 is a remote code execution vulnerability in the way that Chakra scripting engine handles objects in memory in the Microsoft Edge web browser. An attacker needs to convince a user to visit a malicious website or malicious content on a web page that allows user-created content or advertisements in order to exploit this bug.

Coverage

In response to these vulnerability disclosures, Talos is releasing the following Snort rules that detect attempts to exploit them. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional information. Firepower customers should use the latest update to their ruleset by updating their SRU. Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up-to-date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

Snort rules: 48045 - 48057, 48058 - 48060, 48062, 48063, 48072, 48073

Vulnerability Spotlight: VMWare Workstation DoS Vulnerability

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Today, Cisco Talos is disclosing a vulnerability in VMware Workstation that could result in denial of service. VMware Workstation is a widely used virtualization platform designed to run alongside a normal operating system, allowing users to use both virtualized and physical systems concurrently.

TALOS-2018-0589

Discovered by Piotr Bania of Cisco Talos
TALOS-2018-0589 / CVE-2018-6977 is an exploitable denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability in the VMware Workstation 14 software. The vulnerability lies in the pixel shader utilized by VMware Workstation and can be triggered by supplying a malformed pixel shader in either text or binary form inside a VMware guest operating system. This vulnerability can be triggered from VMware guest or VMware hosts and results in a process crashing leading to a DoS state.  Additionally, it is possible to trigger the vulnerability through WEBGL, assuming the browser will not use ANGLE and will supply the malformed shader as intended.

For more technical details, please read our advisory here.

Tested Software:

VMware Workstation 14 (14.1.1.28517)

Coverage

Talos has developed the following Snort rules to detect attempts to exploit this vulnerability. Note that these rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current information, please visit your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rules: 46541 - 46542

For other vulnerabilities Talos has disclosed, please refer to our Vulnerability Report Portal: http://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability-reports/

To review our Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, please visit this site:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/about/security-center/vendor-vulnerability-policy.html

Microsoft WindowsCodecs.dll SniffAndConvertToWideString Information Leak Vulnerability

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These vulnerabilities were discovered by Marcin Noga of Cisco Talos.

Today, Cisco Talos is disclosing a vulnerability in the WindowsCodecs.dll component of the Windows operating system.

WindowsCodecs.dll is a component library that exists in the implementation of Windows Imaging Component (WIC), which provides a framework for working with images and their data. WIC makes it possible for independent software vendors (ISVs) and independent hardware vendors (IHVs) to develop their own image codecs and get the same platform support as standard image formats (ex. TIFF, JPEG, PNG, GIF, BMP and HDPhoto).

Vulnerability Details

TALOS-2018-0644 - Microsoft WindowsCodecs.dll SniffAndConvertToWideString Information Leak Vulnerability

TALOS-2018-0644 (CVE-2018-8506) is an exploitable memory leak vulnerability that exists in the SniffAndConvertToWideString function of WindowsCodecs.dll, version 10.0.17134.1. A specially crafted JPEG file can cause the library to return uninitialized memory, resulting in a memory leak. An attacker can send or share a malformed JPEG file to trigger this vulnerability.

This vulnerability is present in the WindowsCodecs DLL library — an implementation of Windows Imaging Component (WIC) —that provides an extensible framework for working with images and image metadata.

An attacker can leak heap memory due to the improper sting null termination after calling `IWICImagingFactory::CreateDecoderFromFilename` on a JPEG file with properly malformed metadata.

Additional details can be found here.

Affected versions

The vulnerability is confirmed in the WindowsCodecs.dll, version 10.0.17134.1, but it may also be present in the earlier versions of the product. Users are advised to apply the latest Windows update.

Discussion

WIC enables developers to perform image processing operations on any image format through a single, consistent set of common interfaces, without requiring prior knowledge of specific image formats and it provides an extensive architecture for image codecs, pixel formats, and metadata with automatic run-time discovery of new formats.

It's recommended that developers use operating system components, such as Windows Imaging Component, that are updated frequently so they do not have to apply any specific updates to their own products.

Memory leak vulnerabilities are dangerous and could cause the instability in the system, as the program does not properly free the allocated memory and the memory blocks remain marked as being in use. Vulnerable applications continue to waste memory over time, eventually consuming all RAM resources, which can lead to abnormal system behavior. Developers should be aware of these vulnerabilities' potentially damaging consequences.

Coverage

The following SNORTⓇ rules detect attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For all current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rules: 47430 - 47433

GPlayed Trojan - .Net playing with Google Market

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This blog post is authored byVitor Ventura.

Introduction

In a world where everything is always connected, and mobile devices are involved in individuals' day-to-day lives more and more often, malicious actors are seeing increased opportunities to attack these devices. Cisco Talos has identified the latest attempt to penetrate mobile devices — a new Android trojan that we have dubbed "GPlayed." This is a trojan with many built-in capabilities. At the same time, it's extremely flexible, making it a very effective tool for malicious actors. The sample we analyzed uses an icon very similar to Google Apps, with the label "Google Play Marketplace" to disguise itself.

The malicious application is on the left-hand side.



What makes this malware extremely powerful is the capability to adapt after it's deployed. In order to achieve this adaptability, the operator has the capability to remotely load plugins, inject scripts and even compile new .NET code that can be executed. Our analysis indicates that this trojan is in its testing stage but given its potential, every mobile user should be aware of GPlayed. Mobile developers have recently begun eschewing traditional app stores and instead want to deliver their software directly through their own means. But GPlayed is an example of where this can go wrong, especially if a mobile user is not aware of how to distinguish a fake app versus a real one.

Trojan architecture and capabilities

This malware is written in .NET using the Xamarin environment for mobile applications. The main DLL is called "Reznov.DLL." This DLL contains one root class called "eClient," which is the core of the trojan. The imports reveal the use of a second DLL called "eCommon.dll." We determined that the "eCommon" file contains support code and structures that are platform independent. The main DLL also contains eClient subclasses that implement some of the native capabilities.

The package certificate is issued under the package name, which also resembles the name of the main DLL name.

Certificate information

The Android package is named "verReznov.Coampany." The application uses the label "Installer" and its name is "android.app.Application."

Package permissions

The trojan declares numerous permissions in the manifest, from which we should highlight the BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN, which provides nearly full control of the device to the trojan.

This trojan is highly evolved in its design. It has modular architecture implemented in the form of plugins, or it can receive new .NET source code, which will be compiled on the device in runtime.

Initialization of the compiler object

The plugins can be added in runtime, or they can be added as a package resource at packaging time. This means that the authors or the operators can add capabilities without the need to recompile and upgrade the trojan package on the device.

Trojan native capabilities

This is a full-fledged trojan with capabilities ranging from those of a banking trojan to a full spying trojan. This means that the malware can do anything from harvest the user's banking credentials, to monitoring the device's location. There are several indicators (see section "trojan activity" below) that it is in its last stages of development, but it has the potential to be a serious threat.

Trojan details

Upon boot, the trojan will start by populating a shared preferences file with the configuration it has on its internal structures. Afterward, it will start several timers to execute different tasks. The first timer will be fired on the configured interval (20 seconds in this case), pinging the command and control (C2) server. The response can either be a simple "OK," or can be a request to perform some action on the device. The second timer will run every five seconds and it will try to enable the WiFi if it's disabled. The third timer will fire every 10 seconds and will attempt to register the device into the C2 and register wake-up locks on the system to control the device's status.

During the trojan registration stage, the trojan exfiltrates private information such as the phone's model, IMEI, phone number and country. It will also report the version of Android that the phone is running and any additional capabilities.

Device registration

This is the last of the three main timers that are created. The trojan will register the SMS handler, which will forward the contents and the sender of all of the SMS messages on the phone to the C2.

The final step in the trojan's initialization is the escalation and maintenance of privileges in the device. This is done both by requesting admin privileges on the device and asking the user to allow the application to access the device's settings.

Privilege escalation requests

The screens asking for the user's approval won't close unless the user approves the privilege escalation. If the user closes the windows, they will appear again due to the timer configuration.

After the installation of the trojan, it will wait randomly between three and five minutes to activate one of the native capabilities — these are implemented on the eClient subclass called "GoogleCC." This class will open a WebView with a Google-themed page asking for payment in order to use the Google services. This will take the user through several steps until it collects all the necessary credit card information, which will be checked online and exfiltrated to the C2. During this process, an amount of money, configured by the malicious operator, is requested to the user.

Steps to request the user's credit card information

In our sample configuration, the request for the views above cannot be canceled or removed from the screen — behaving just like a screen lock that won't be disabled without providing credit card information.

All communication with the C2 is done over HTTP. It will use either a standard web request or it will write data into a web socket if the first method fails. The C2 can also use WebSocket as a backup communication channel.

Before sending any data to the C2 using the trojan attempts to disguise its data, the data is serialized using JSON, which is then encoded in Base64. However, the trojan replaces the '=' by 'AAAZZZXXX', the '+' by '|' and the '/' by '.' to disguise the Base64.

Request encoding process

The HTTP requests follow the format below, while on the WebSocket only the query data is written.

<server path>?q=<IMEI>-<REQUEST CODE>:<Obfuscated Base64 encoded data>

As is common with trojans, the communication is always initiated by the trojan on the device to the C2. The request codes are actually replies to the C2 action requests, which are actually called "responses." There are 27 response codes that the C2 can use to make requests to the trojan, which pretty much match what's listed in the capabilities section.
  • Error
  • Registration
  • Ok
  • Empty
  • SendSMS
  • RequestGoogleCC
  • Wipe
  • OpenBrowser
  • SendUSSD
  • RequestSMSList
  • RequestAppList
  • RequestLocation
  • ShowNotification
  • SetLockPassword
  • LockNow
  • MuteSound
  • LoadScript
  • LoadPlugin
  • ServerChange
  • StartApp
  • CallPhone
  • SetPingTimer
  • SMSBroadcast
  • RequestContacts
  • AddInject
  • RemoveInject
  • Evaluate
Another feature of this trojan is the ability to register injects, which are JavaScript snippets of code. These will be executed in a WebView object created by the trojan. This gives the operators the capability to trick the user into accessing any site while stealing the user's cookies or forging form fields, like account numbers or phone numbers.

Trojan activity

At the time of the writing of this post, all URLs (see IOC section) found on the sample were inactive, and it does not seem to be widespread. There are some indicators that this sample is just a test sample on its final stages of development. There are several strings and labels still mentioning 'test' or 'testcc' — even the URL used for the credit card data exfiltration is named "testcc.php."

Debug information on logcat

Another indicator is the amount of debugging information the trojan is still generating — a production-level trojan would keep its logging to a minimum.

The only sample was found on public repositories and almost seemed to indicate a test run to determine the detection ratio of the sample. We have observed this trojan being submitted to public antivirus testing platforms, once as a package and once for each DLL to determine the detection ratio. The sample analyzed was targeted at Russian-speaking users, as most of the user interaction pages are written in Russian. However, given the way the trojan is built, it is highly customizable, meaning that adapting it to a different language would be extremely easy. The wide range of capabilities doesn't limit this trojan to a specific malicious activity like a banking trojan or a ransomware. This makes it impossible to create a target profile.

Conclusion

This trojan shows a new path for threats to evolve. Having the ability to move code from desktops to mobile platforms with no effort, like the eCommon.DLL demonstrates that malicious actors can create hybrid threats faster and with fewer resources involved than ever before. This trojan's design and implementation is of an uncommonly high level, making it a dangerous threat. These kinds of threats will become more common, as more and more companies decide to publish their software directly to consumers.

There have been several recent examples of companies choosing to release their software directly to consumers, bypassing traditional storefronts. The average user might not have the necessary skills to distinguish legitimate sites from malicious ones. We've seen that this has been the case for many years with spear-phishing campaigns on desktop and mobile platforms, so, unfortunately, it doesn't seem that this will change any time soon. And this just means attackers will continue to be successful.

Coverage

Additional ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.

Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors.

Cisco Cloud Web Security (CWS) or Web Security Appliance (WSA) web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Email Security can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.

Network Security appliances such as Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention System (NGIPS), and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products.

Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.

Open Source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

Indicators of compromise (IOC)


URLs
hxxp://5.9.33.226:5416
hxxp://172.110.10.171:85/testcc.php
hxxp://sub1.tdsworker.ru:5555/3ds/

Hash values
Package.apk - A342a16082ea53d101f556b50532651cd3e3fdc7d9e0be3aa136680ad9c6a69f
eCommon.dl - 604deb75eedf439766896f05799752de268baf437bf89a7185540627ab4a4bd1
Reznov.dll - 17b8665cdbbb94482ca970a754d11d6e29c46af6390a2d8e8193d8d6a527dec3

Custom activity prefix
com.cact.CAct

Threat Roundup for October 5 to October 12

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Today, as we do every week, Talos is giving you a glimpse into the most prevalent threats we’ve observed this week — covering the dates between Oct. 5 and 12. As with previous roundups, this post isn’t meant to be an in-depth analysis. Instead, we will summarize the threats we’ve observed by highlighting key behavioral characteristics and indicators of compromise, and discussing how our customers are automatically protected from these threats.

As a reminder, the information provided for the following threats in this post is non-exhaustive and current as of the date of publication. Additionally, please keep in mind that IOC searching is only one part of threat hunting. Spotting a single IOC does not necessarily indicate maliciousness. Detection and coverage for the following threats is subject to updates, pending additional threat or vulnerability analysis. For the most current information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center, Snort.org, or ClamAV.net.

The most prevalent threats highlighted in this roundup are:

  • Win.Malware.Emotet-6710203-0
    Malware
    Emotet is a banking trojan that has remained relevant due to its continual evolution and its ability to bypass antivirus products.
     
  • Win.Malware.Fuerboos-6712723-0
    Malware
    Fuerboos is a backdoor trojan that monitors user activity and captures that information to eventually send it back to a server. It utilizes a double flux network where multiple hosts act as proxies to further prevent researchers from locating the actual malicious server.
     
  • Win.Dropper.Demp-6714293-0
    Dropper
    Demp drops DLL files that are later injected into the explorer process. It is also capable of accepting commands from a command and control (C2) server and exfiltrating system information.
     
  • Win.Malware.Dgbv-6714452-0
    Malware
    DGBV is malware written in Delphi and is packed with Inno Setup, a free software installation system. Once deployed, DGBV collects sensitive information from the infected host and sends it to a C2, including browser password databases.
     
  • Doc.Downloader.Valyria-6713303-0
    Downloader
    Valyria is a malicious Word document family that is used to distribute other malware. This campaign is currently spreading Emotet.
     
  • Win.Downloader.Dofoil-6714608-0
    Downloader
    Dofoil, AKA SmokeLoader, is primarily used to download and execute additional malware. Read more about this threat on our blog.
     
  • Win.Malware.Zbot-6714649-0
    Malware
    Zbot, also known as Zeus, is trojan that steals information such as banking credentials. It has numerous capabilities, including key-logging using methods such as key-logging and form grabbing.
     

Threats

Win.Malware.Emotet-6710203-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\dimcloud
Mutexes
  • PEM6A4
  • PEM6B0
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 96[.]114[.]157[.]81
  • 24[.]203[.]4[.]40
  • 216[.]137[.]249[.]154
  • 98[.]191[.]228[.]168
  • 41[.]204[.]202[.]41
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • smtp[.]aavanira[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • N/A
File Hashes
  • 0eba4bf670ebd4381150a0d9e1fd113561898849ac53fd22e0eee1afe05de77d
  • 12faaf05baa1ead6dd6559f2eed72373d78eff2e462c59fc055ac098b8ad7d38
  • 1affd33a6864d27ffb7b2398630c06610a3c9d81d0f84548b7a66c431d2b733a
  • 1d75775d6b05c878611b678b1bceacc76c888fb086ad2c47111aa696dad4b59f
  • 1fca28e3264af2703e3e221b9193e93351b3b9ef3474643fb27d589b8c10840e
  • 20dec98c8003e986251cc8a765a931783203ec75eae436e9df2248a465321e53
  • 213395fba51bb15feb10d201b78df2a8c4bfcd25498f672b02391a77647cb781
  • 36bc6b1def213cb8f10670fa3d574f831fdd63a9a5f2a66f66c1d580dfb75955
  • 3e9e1062c311605bb78e8df525eaa11268ad5b547ae9295669a0c751e16f5a13
  • 49a9333f65eb8a84e74b14a928d7ad94737c95117eae62e87bf84617637f04a1
  • 6c231427d0fc1cf9ad431c7c5a8973db04e5a5cd2ef3205d6f544ae3b20a57f8
  • 74e5ce08015255e67a1e21dfd2e44afb613a329b4bc6a4a678d1fb18e0d45412
  • 8e0652595b5c7661ce08ef8c986ad31cef38020f80f7afcd500a9acbdd6ae774
  • 995cca730bcdeecd0e497999e7ff2a4a6659fae45130e05599f0d716125c00a3
  • a5a882b548a7b4faa705f9defef61566fdc778c983f58b71578896448f2721fb
  • aa9c066ef31f701399812d51bf46231d88911bf062098e4428e8768002d6274c
  • af253123e7bc9a5732d21ecca3d9d24db4c3a1d616fc8d8b14c3bdaa97bac3b9
  • b7fab8bd7cfc07cf11cbf012b9d926cc4953df301b4d5bf8df12106d9d748aca
  • c0fa19dd12030a9c24375a25dbfd413a6fd123b2b0451902af767167b313aad5
  • c1ea9d852216d51cffbed3da3ef2fc23156f523096f900a9127ca91cbda542fb
  • ed96c1d12554779cdef56ebd87ac4390815c006cb7771608297377cabc3a8023
  • fb05b1c6edb8961620fff003d4ea496d889e5e217f28e77a7d6c37a6c73e3f17

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid




Umbrella



Win.Malware.Fuerboos-6712723-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • N/A
Mutexes
  • _!SHMSFTHISTORY!_
  • !PrivacIE!SharedMem!Mutex
  • SmartScreen_ClientId_Mutex
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 54[.]39[.]175[.]170
  • 51[.]68[.]239[.]251
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • s928eid19oqieuqoeu[.]com
  • 11wiwy19wpqoqsos292uwoqow83[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\04pnjlnm.cmdline
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\04pnjlnm.dll
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\04pnjlnm.out
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\F256.bin
File Hashes
  • 033a197eb9289e06f7541f3b66fdf308d8abce2fc4e7269776a664bde3e3945d
  • 05f4d4b6a171b5dc1023b75983a6203f2a958f39a821c3483d05ee30c3a972d5
  • 07783f32930a4b4b595976f347fc6272c1ac67e73b173a962ee4cb6cc92fd757
  • 07b55edfd0e61cd0e120e0245dfe1dce775405c1aa12ea7717afdf3f55fae0a4
  • 0d87696146e48e023816ca67ff8bc449bc326e6592d1fb588283eed4d6b80357
  • 0df85fbe16e6252a12ad9096590d3f1b9af548f0972edfb9393521ac86ca26cd
  • 10c075586237c573630d7361e55b910c38f67d9c8255592858b80e57c4c5b796
  • 11a4da86de7617dbe52f7b89818626f10b4c4c326b71b2a7c8f4477293b5de92
  • 12124b503f2989dea4dc2bbb9edc1054971075d7b326836693f5623ca46ffd1b
  • 13a05b5af10b15d1ad5e296c75507b65c70f669cb5e48f3174fc28d9053e1ee9
  • 14881ef04a4af32b3cd29d413557c5bee31efe0d1f35db0b5a570dac7dc0c6cc
  • 19e9de7427f46bac7637d0a9a633d3b34d8e515df48b39229c1b673bf5105681
  • 1df9d199d46a2f8f0b345b3fd3fdd77ac7c0449df03e156f508b3d0d1600607c
  • 1fae65f06e00e08ec2d60519cd416335c7b26f0e92d4ef2b65e72f5a3d166172
  • 1fd513421c26ae15b03dae61fe9932fbe7fc9bcc65a268867fed5a3987df18c0
  • 23d849dd6ce38c93fb47adfdc6a29c28d7d9993534fc35eb9745396dab3c2edc
  • 25466f6ed1011635a332ef93c465d5f6803e4099a09b8e3764f3d29a012e70fb
  • 2773a65c5791d9382e498e84c352d5175445669c5b566c3bca150d9c320ebfe0
  • 27ed0a3e9ca95105f734e9aa55fe6a65fafb196a291913af197a48c263865685
  • 2ab936982eadd726bab936ab68bef211b3ffafd6f6f36dd1406830db72aae529
  • 2b728ccccb05a1b03cb4ad4ccac320d74feeafe2f2be0a06f635fd9f56daec65
  • 2b7cf52c1c83af3ad9349e551619be5031db6f58049cf7697e155ad25dd6519a
  • 2e534b2373b08930ff05e39491405c6580be5bfd194ec6b9798dad7b5ba841e3
  • 2ede38df97248bfea976a6985427a1f6dc3206b96dab218e14354653192576e8
  • 30e2c4ce1d069cfbd7b3be5025a022e432a681b38dc1b60d2d83e51a160056be

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid




Umbrella



Win.Dropper.Demp-6714293-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Yqar
  • <HKCU>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Currentversion\Run
Mutexes
  • N/A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 203[.]78[.]107[.]112
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • www[.]siamrich[.]co[.]th
Files and or directories created
  • %AppData%\Albea\wuzuo.xuo
  • %AppData%\Ebodyk\ruce.exe
  • %AppData%\Ogno\ruof.kuh
File Hashes
  • 1179d11e07f6bfc5e19bd4e715ffcc9ea8bb3c0e7cc6d4fe4e462f5433dab8c5
  • 13bcb923aa00b7399e31fce0ad7c73c95d046b9fd9cc61fdad54a2001a24ef52
  • 1751b6a0e5e0eb5709e63cf05f362e0256aff5c56bf919ce510cfa88836e7a3f
  • 1dade14775862a6978810f9edc71679d7d7c128d469f2275258717ed88906d25
  • 2e224ae755c32a914bc7be948a805b358fcc26ff1a95a04c6a05117501b164f3
  • 5cb4338d783396dea3968b5f1ef16a3db4fca907a2c03e715aaafc61200eb20b
  • 68f758a0d97e4f1a3dfa4c637c3d19332217c1c0fdf04e416d708cb9a7f47e10
  • 7ee688e6cc5e3d6f27cb09c82842d7094f8de6d0900fba7c7686fe6e5edbb314
  • 87dc7ea718d5dc4916bdee2a1b928921babc884f1754d5e01152b8bc868b6124
  • 8f615ff9e9bafa6c0278fd4914bad01d4457689ab7a271d674ef0c7da569390c
  • 967cf3782024def1f1bb478d12ab3658aa9081188a5f8a1b97bfb9daf37f1d98
  • b816f28c64b91a88e8675191bdfc6fb6cee14808a475bd23594637a033bfa3a9
  • cc7264cc4f7b0692935640eeaaccd71319a0459fe094f9b16cd055fa3cfb6ad7
  • cf020f6d42ef17fb0afcb5d9abf51721fd2de655e61a565fbc3891574b278e57
  • eb88635d91cbb0f85d235a2aec00fca2217fc16f076a5fb79cb6764c16eb002c
  • ee8a67421a69bfd280bb7429e19efb3ee7fc403db592315963934409c841fed4
  • f7589669d7b57285986b0ec280083fe66fb80aadc8b9d0ff279daac8459eb50d
  • fbda080d12a9da511c5763b8269b393c3f76a511ff05a4c740cb017d933605fc
  • fc9f06ce525f321e664d8a9c94bc7d8fe8420aadead196300451f5ade6867bff

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid




Win.Malware.Dgbv-6714452-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • N/A
Mutexes
  • 3749282D282E1E80C56CAE5A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 45[.]122[.]138[.]6
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • filitimonieenama[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • %AppData%\D282E1\1E80C5.lck
File Hashes
  • 1d9cbdafba2ed47d7a420ea42b690664d06245f5c25b94cfdcbc3a1a33499164
  • 23100d1c82e06b6b899d4f04cfdd393c05ca656767c7a7648981fd14973ee7a6
  • 418d65586f05d278901417b0c8d7c4752ea7415b2c8fa6c093a460a434c02c52
  • 58be850629c361f619da13c0106a8e7a1e61e07855fc23aa956e283a626ccaa8
  • 60ae0309004f39b41fb96fa278219875668ad139974a35a6b5bee5ad42caf985
  • 6ce5513f53a548aad74508dd376456b2cb7a91323c4ea27e2410ead309300b86
  • 78e19745a107b3d196d476f81feeeb01663787869910f369b176c23c3536aaca
  • 7dfd6d093b0fd406f734d92b3fac5e59631c0649170670c220743be74344634f
  • 8b6348185f0d21c809f2d924f868bdf8ee2ea7b9ba59c41783a35817dfaf17c9
  • 919d0e14a92fee33c9ec402b0e02b5282fd5cae502aadc2c490d3bfdf4350ad8
  • bbd0a4000591033769be4ab26ca2fbe334440c4b56acb329433fc98c3405ceff
  • c0a6d9b38153cc61dd042e7b9ea02df9b8d0958f27f31d5be5d89dd66303b0b4
  • c6def90e73d83bfdfcaff20902a343f7d600f84ecb0a6531aff7b59a06ea8455
  • c9abc638ac5e06271bede0ee3880ef8e034a11bd0cda260ef82d4b6ee978c292

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid



Umbrella




Doc.Downloader.Valyria-6713303-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\SYSTEM\CONTROLSET001\SERVICES\dimcloud
Mutexes
  • Global\I98B68E3C
  • Global\M98B68E3C
  • PEM758
  • PEM60C
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 12[.]139[.]45[.]113
  • 216[.]215[.]112[.]198
  • 81[.]215[.]192[.]201
  • 113[.]193[.]217[.]34
  • 96[.]254[.]126[.]140
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • optics-line[.]com
  • ironspot[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • N/A
File Hashes
  • 0a212916b4767564de4a7b5ae348c56b4d9c5a799723e901352280a3e8d64761
  • 0b62c13a5558d201266446b870d97eb458a82eab17d69a3d566a6e5abb158c6a
  • 171e0e8440bb8152cef9ae20dec4a170f93b1312aadf782490cc36adf5c301a4
  • 17b6cacdac7e3dc56d0b60ea7367e5073048e30aff6742e65b0a6f2b52b6255a
  • 1b90e481327517deced0d43590dfd5715ac0d1645f78f65239aa091f653f4c07
  • 2456f8835a6452a6bc07db97990ac81977f1102f41b53ffc68ed935022caee67
  • 2581d63d7d772a3b1ac3b5ae095b03a9a76e771b3d153ac3e95ead93759880de
  • 3c985296fc326089a695b2ffb78ab22b5bf6b0c28b62c9f8532281487479c99c
  • 400d3ec69470e65f173f5ced9fd5bbedfa0458332639d5f48d4d46ad93f19c8a
  • 50c4e66b9f3cbbab3298dc9113b16e485c17feecf296cab4829607942e6b63d2
  • 5e3034a30bef39ff753853f3712bedc99baf5c0e3e84b8de6665e21716e9bf87
  • 63ed9611ef53d62886a487b66638d5b4e022fb791182130d7fcef35a07f79080
  • 6886615f85136e0c0624642251d7b5396c57f7ba5cdce955d2dd0b1f0be7e6f5
  • 6a5ce4ce91c196918807df2bcfefe256d76970e5b8e87b40df1757639943090e
  • 6af525481cb0998d33e3a3c4954da1545f0f6dcb25b899b450d98a4bc3b17c13
  • 7603db9e307d728676caadf8d1e42733071087e6dc72a7a3ec747372fa0c965e
  • 8319cf7cd706879ced641e96ce84ae78286c5eb3a8de911aaa449a922e2af6d4
  • 8cf4ea0f49b0d6a0df0bcb066bea9bf27ee10ac34dd3e240c7cb19582b9041c7
  • 97c4f7a023bf61ca96d3de53931c0fad28ca2197740999e930c8d702a346ffb7
  • 9b58e48bc55057f200d72f6f6646097a4e1285bdea85073c3e0313bd953ee13d
  • 9c8cd646405cc6c78665e8702051107b0531f7918829985335e6f5348c20a873
  • ae445853c56dddcbdf899ab132adb7cd9cfe9eb7048ee643838bb85b7422ac37
  • afddef6744bf508b82295fa1478a03e8016d10c6647925c46a8f0f8ea6bb3a3b
  • b11cc1ae5ed0b068cc101b046a9c2c8a270d751273cf320934b790fe5afb91a3
  • c77fcc0be04543148bbfab87443d2d81a712ba16c24f22963a0670275eab6bb4

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid




Umbrella



Win.Downloader.Dofoil-6714608-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\07771b47
Mutexes
  • C77D0F25
  • 244F2418
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 77[.]182[.]47[.]152
  • 77[.]214[.]6[.]192
  • 77[.]198[.]181[.]15
  • 83[.]226[.]115[.]86
  • 77[.]253[.]52[.]129
  • 8[.]123[.]232[.]109
  • 94[.]227[.]178[.]89
  • 8[.]110[.]105[.]136
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Files and or directories created
  • N/A
File Hashes
  • 01ce9f47d246b23480249c21385f28af4f8f6c6f72de0e16f0d5995add2cc4f4
  • 0b1e8ab791aa74ec379a8699c6e50fcda918c02b08aa4460bea8a842931cfb1b
  • 0defb11ec4549eb802fb841cbb58ec72f8bde65bbed48245e0d83c6c942d941d
  • 2273e345b799cc3ed8954fd82b62ad47f16615cb59531355039349d7ee84de23
  • 26f4a9f28493a8250d38061536289c0249bb88b8e12cd304a70ae06475b4072e
  • 2e2aa0b99d225a1583cb40ca233054fef69fe724190cfff0b7ffcd6c805223fd
  • 303a92f502157d4a99c21c2ec6cd05cfa2400497df59a2e9ce322333ab6f78a9
  • 404f7030cb01a7cdbae2ab38adafd587aa5da0cfc5bb55b92e7cf7b095ac543c
  • 47326515c02c1fb96899aebf38fd18919682d79a1445ffa343dfa26e70261231
  • 4c509d782de2ef525b83dbd61f70a59a2c64b1bbc8d02f063c0e081a2bc6b214
  • 53b5bc66cc62f04439d75203bd7e0ff040e055c90598741f9dc26c59ce41dd64
  • 5746ac7b26eab61a51ca790eecc9bfdf120fc711f4173c54c99ea653d154bd4b
  • 5a36ad9f59dd0c8906cf6dd9c395785ba449c9dddc3843cc2d9a9aecd5f78c47
  • 65360c29dd0b0cddcbc77cce83af3761439423c72276dd425755e6dbd3bfc171
  • 6653fe7c4e305c524ca7d59ff8286bfe944af1e4672e11f8a08a7cea0a2dd332
  • 6a8a02f29f22cbdcf42ca25ee3d26e4220c70cb133595bc9b3354742bb4a3a2e
  • 743e3645040914b245661a2e145fb3237237cdb30a82ce6ee59461cd83505841
  • 7ca20063faa25398f5e4ddc7d08e5bd39e71d816caeec5214bcb14c261d5ed25
  • 83e460c7faf4d06a0b255a8ad4175577e9b8cdd8bb88645dff1a8841fc4c72ae
  • 8b9e1ef2b8e37a459b1ead71b6b5c684aa5589b3f6a3fc7aacba4b7c0c3085d4
  • 93fd66843eeefba26d494abf82bd69f972913c59e109a97a8871f1150e75ae01
  • 95c587cce682887a0d9d6297e966a9fd82590cf557aac4767eff29ceafa373e2
  • 99f203e4a8ee38b92ca80807b5350974d809505539284fa53d64b83aee28a749
  • a48b79aa1d76c9c8480466757d3d198bfefa19434fe4697129d73bce75a412b0
  • a593ae31f46ba0871580a5d7af3a8abd29fccd164c92dafc6c53f5b69487f717

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid




Win.Malware.Zbot-6714649-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\Waec
Mutexes
  • N/A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 176[.]99[.]4[.]7
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Files and or directories created
  • %AppData%\Gybyoq\uzbu.ecu
  • %AppData%\Iftovi\ihuk.exe
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\tmpbed48548.bat
File Hashes
  • 075954d09355c42653ebb8340916245a18e28b8ad5d7c701f2f3208f639922a9
  • 168c7ecd964fcae27d56aeb73ebb5917b2a7f025d708019b870f184e92cf42ab
  • 22bdc85124aa553038e1d5b27411c67b931406597cebdc3ab7eb149077695599
  • 259f3336bd8bb16138f45cf341f7290e7edfbee2872a9927184d02643ac86b85
  • 31903b752e05db104908f6e2853597d5990f0fb5378573f98870c57509765b28
  • 480e51e1bef08a8870a7d852abab4ac58179d2fa8031a9a080ce8a5a04a3f073
  • 508517c5a9cbab74b1458ae66f1b744b74fd1833594eb319592416d7825f5d83
  • 5a8b1aecc07c0c707aabfe22e52a7f70cc65aeac7127f7fd87ddf74a172212dd
  • 5b9b975f6f67ed9bf8f45db61117330b31770dc26aecd0262253531106bc74ad
  • 5e0535beb2b18aa4a2a5db338485f6e87fba66cd79fb0afb0c1cc18a3d526b22
  • 62bbd7305b5ccb36a11f1f8d81065daa537e1716fb1983d8b411993d365b2fda
  • 829cc5bc44063c564e0cbfda5d7c4538df9c6eb54f37eb09cf14757dda2f6ad5
  • 897527a34498f81ffac99f626abcc0045cc5953173c84f90766280d38edc4f73
  • 90e57a0f986925b7bf5a9114ff99d0c764c82c2348ae9694cb3b49a10de49ee8
  • 911529ae29929ba58e3e2f7c2b1db4c8697df181bc1122ed2a96268429eae8c6
  • a3ea8684813d8849686a07809e576ea5276fd63de74fe65406871f7b3b3f185d
  • a52de51d2c4ca3bcb65d3c35b0a02c2b83142d784e420cd06c79d500d24587d3
  • ab3e38a476d1d7e136c670d16afeff8ac0a3f82578d0398ba1ec91792c447411
  • b398d2d8c26361f98d8341bb38e42f9553b107756c0aeb5985688de7af309de6
  • c25837b0eecbcac9726e6f6b41502b65796f5ddd20a42aa0311f18ed85302809
  • db58802e343b45a0d173a3bfab5fae9fe1c6188a6a175042a496f2e7ae1b906e
  • ecb59e655db783f2d4515b90f1045b154827820de20b09ebebe382895726bbcb
  • fa1962bf247694be787999b8b94dba8a09728cb258776b067a01128d3e073d01
  • fa9c078a6fbc67f8545381c4dbef455ce3e4e69c518ffdb6080103b98742b00b
  • fab9b2ba302d819180f19df41bf91abc7370b22fa0a08d35bc6a55dcb9751471

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

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ThreatGrid


Old dog, new tricks - Analysing new RTF-based campaign distributing Agent Tesla, Loki with PyREbox

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This blog post was authored by Edmund Brumaghin and Holger Unterbrink with contributions from Emmanuel Tacheau.


Executive Summary


Cisco Talos has discovered a new malware campaign that drops the sophisticated information-stealing trojan called "Agent Tesla," and other malware such as the Loki information stealer. Initially, Talos' telemetry systems detected a highly suspicious document that wasn't picked up by common antivirus solutions. However, Threat Grid, Cisco's unified malware analysis and threat intelligence platform, identified the unknown file as malware. The adversaries behind this malware use a well-known exploit chain, but modified it in such a way so that antivirus solutions don't detect it. In this post, we will outline the steps the adversaries took to remain undetected, and why it's important to use more sophisticated software to track these kinds of attacks. If undetected, Agent Tesla has the ability to steal user's login information from a number of important pieces of software, such as Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Outlook and many others. It can also be used to capture screenshots, record webcams, and allow attackers to install additional malware on infected systems.



Technical Details


In most cases, the first stage of the attack occurred in a similar way to the FormBook malware campaign, which we discussed earlier this year in a blog post. The actors behind the previous FormBook campaign used CVE-2017-0199 — a remote code execution vulnerability in multiple versions of Microsoft Office — to download and open an RTF document from inside a malicious DOCX file. We have also observed newer campaigns being used to distribute Agent Tesla and Loki that are leveraging CVE-2017-11882. An example of one of the malware distribution URLs is in the screenshot below. Besides Agent Tesla and Loki, this infrastructure is also distributing many other malware families, such as Gamarue, which has the ability to completely take over a user's machine and has the same capabilities as a typical information stealer.

The aforementioned FormBook blog contains more information about this stage. Many users have the assumption that modern Microsoft Word documents are less dangerous than RTF or DOC files. While this is partially true, attackers can still find ways with these newer file formats to exploit various vulnerabilities.

Figure 1 - First stage exploit

In the case of Agent Tesla, the downloaded file was an RTF file with the SHA256 hash cf193637626e85b34a7ccaed9e4459b75605af46cedc95325583b879990e0e61. At the time the file was analyzed, it had almost no detections on the multi-engine antivirus scanning website VirusTotal. Only two out of 58 antivirus programs found anything suspicious. The programs that flagged this sample were only warning about a wrongly formatted RTF file. AhnLab-V3 marked it for "RTF/Malform-A.Gen," while Zoner said it was likely flagged for "RTFBadVersion."

However, Cisco's Threat Grid painted a different picture, and identified the file as malware.

Figure 2 - ThreatGrid Behavior Indicators (BI)

Figure 2 above shows just a subset of the triggered behaviour indicators (BI), and the part of the process tree below shows the highly suspicious execution chain.
Figure 3 - ThreatGrid process tree

In figure 3, we can see that Winword.exe starts, and a bit later, a svchost process executes the Microsoft Equation Editor (EQNEDT32.exe), which starts a process called "scvhost.exe". Equation Editor is a tool that Microsoft Office uses as a helper application to embed mathematical equations into documents. Word for example, uses OLE/COM functions to start the Equation Editor, which matches what we see in figure 3. It's pretty uncommon for the Equation Editor application to start other executables, like the executable shown in figure 3. Not to mention that an executable using such a similar name, like the system file "svchost.exe," is suspicious on its own. A user could easily miss the fact that the file name is barely changed.

The Threat Grid process timeline below confirms that this file is behaving like typical malware.

Figure 4 - ThreatGrid process timeline

You can see in figure 4 at points 1 and 2 that the Equation Editor downloaded a file called "xyz[1].123" and then created the scvhost.exe process, which created another instance [scvhost.exe(26)] of itself a bit later (blue rectangle). Typical command and control (C2) traffic follows at point 4. At this point, we were sure that this is malware. The question was — why isn't it detected by any antivirus systems? And how does it manage to fly under the radar?

The malicious RTF file


The RTF standard is a proprietary document file format developed by Microsoft as a cross-platform document interchange. A simplified, standard RTF file looks like what you can see in figure 4. It is built out of text and control words (strings). The upper portion is the source code and the lower shows how this file is displayed in Microsoft Word.

Figure 5 - Simple RTF document

RTF files do not support any macro language, but they do support Microsoft Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) objects and Macintosh Edition Manager subscriber objects via the '\object' control word. The user can link or embed an object from the same or different format into the RTF document. For example, the user can embed a mathematical equation formula, created by the Microsoft Equation Editor into the RTF document. Simplified, it would be stored in the object's data as a hexadecimal data stream. If the user opens this RTF file with Word, it hands over the object data to the Equation Editor application via OLE functions and gets the data back in a format that Word can display. In other words, the equation is displayed as being embedded in the document, even if Word could not handle it without the external application. This is pretty much what the file "3027748749.rtf" is doing. The only difference is, it is adding a lot of obfuscation, as you can see in figure 6. The big disadvantages of the RTF standard are that it comes with so many control words and common RTF parsers are supposed to ignore anything they don't know. Therefore, adversaries have plenty of options to obfuscate the content of the RTF files.

Figure 6 - 3027748749.rtf

We were able to use the rtfdump/rtfobj tools to verify the structure and extract the actual object data payload, despite the fact that the RTF file was heavily obfuscated. Figure 8 shows that the file tries to start the Microsoft Equation Editor (class name: EQuATioN.3).

Figure 7 - rtfdump

Figure 8 - rtfobj

In figure 6, you can also see that the adversaries are using the \objupdate trick. This forces the embedded object to update before it's displayed. In other words, the user does not have to click on the object before it's loaded. This would be the case for "normal" objects. But by force-opening the file, the exploit starts right away.

Let's have a look to the objdata content from above, converted to a hexadecimal binary stream. More header details can be found here.

Figure 9 - Headers

We can find a similar MTEF Header like the one described in the FormBook post, but to avoid detection, the adversaries have changed the header's values. The only difference is that, except in the MTEF version field, the actors have filled the header fields with random values. The MTEF version field needs to be 2 or 3 to make the exploit work.

Figure 10 - MTEF V2 header

After the MTEF header, we have an unknown MTEF byte stream tag of two bytes (F1 01) followed by the a Font Tag (08 E0 7B … ).The bytes following the Font Tag (B9 C3 …) do not look like a normal font name, so this is a good indicator that we are looking at an exploit. The bytes do look very different to what we have seen in our research mentioned previously, but let's decode them.

Figure 11 - Shellcode - new campaign.

This looks pretty similar to what we have seen before. In figure 12, you can see the decoded shellcode from our previous research.

Figure 12 - Shellcode - former campaign.

The adversaries have just changed registers and some other minor parts. At this point, we are already pretty sure that this is CVE-2017-11882, but let's prove this.

PyREBox rock 'n' roll


In order to verify that the malicious RTF file is exploiting CVE-2017-11882, we used PyREBox, a dynamic analysis engine developed by Talos. This tool allows us to instrument the execution of a complete system and monitor different events, such as instruction execution, memory read and writes, operating system events, and also provides interactive analysis capabilities that allow us to inspect the state of the emulated system at any time. For additional information about the tool, please refer to the blog posts about its release and the malware monitoring scriptspresented at the Hack in the Box 2018 conference.

For this analysis, we leveraged the shadow stack plugin, which was released together with other exploit analysis scripts (shellcode detection and stack pivoting detection) at EuskalHack Security Congress III earlier this year (slides available). This script monitors all the call and RET instructions executed under the context of a given process (in this case, the equation editor process), and maintains a shadow stack that keeps track of all the valid return addresses (those that follow every executed call instruction).

The only thing we need to do is configure the plugin to monitor the equation editor process (the plugin will wait for it to be created), and open the RTF document inside the emulated guest. PyREBox will stop the execution of the system whenever a RET instruction jumps into an address that is not preceded by a call instruction. This approach allows us to detect the exploitation of stack overflow bugs that overwrite the return address stored on the stack. Once the execution is stopped, PyREBox spawns an interactive IPython shell that allows us to inspect the system and debug and/or trace the execution of the equation editor process.

Figure 13 - PyREBox stops the execution the moment it detects the first return to an invalid address: 0x44fd22.

PyREBox will stop the execution on the return address at 0x00411874, which belongs to the vulnerable function reported in CVE-2017-11882. In this case, the malware authors decided to leverage this vulnerability to overwrite the return address with an address contained in Equation Editor's main executable module: 0x0044fd22. If we examine this address (see Figure 13), we see that it points to another RET instruction that will pop another address from the stack and jump into it. The shadow stack plugin detects this situation again, and stops the execution on the next step of the exploit.

Figure 14 — First stage of the shellcode.

Figure 14 shows the first stage of the shellcode, which is executed right after the second RET. This shellcode will call to GlobalLock function (0x18f36e) and afterward, will jump into a second buffer containing the second stage of the shellcode.

Figure 15 - Start of the second stage of the shellcode.

The second stage of the shellcode consists of a sequence of jmp/call instructions followed by a decryption loop.

Figure 16 - Decryption loop of the second stage of the shellcode.

This decryption loop will unpack the final payload of the shellcode, and finally jump into this decoded buffer. PyREBox allows us to dump the memory buffer containing the shellcode at any point during the execution. There are several ways to achieve this, but one possible way is to use the volatility framework (which is available through the PyREBox shell) to list the VAD regions in the process and dump the buffer containing the interesting code. This buffer can then be imported into IDA Pro for a deeper analysis.

Figure 17 — Decrypted buffer of the second stage (final stage of the shellcode).

This final stage of the shellcode is quite straightforward. It leverages standard techniques to find the kernel32.dll module in the linked list of loaded modules available in the PEB, and afterward, will parse its export table to locate the LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress functions. By using these functions, the script resolves several API functions (ExpandEnvironmentStrings, URLDownloadToFileA, and ShellExecute) to download and execute the xyz.123 binary from the URL, which we have already seen in the Threat Grid analysis. The shellcode starts this executable with the name "scvhost.exe," which we have also seen before in the Threat Grid report.

We have also seen several other campaigns using the exact same infection chain, but delivering Loki as the final payload. We list these in the IOC sections.


Payload details


Let's look into the final payload file "xyz.123" (a8ac66acd22d1e194a05c09a3dc3d98a78ebcc2914312cdd647bc209498564d8) or "scvhost.exe" if you prefer the process name from above.

$ file xyz123.exe

xyz123.exe: PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows

Loading the file into dnSpy— a .NET assembly editor, decompiler and debugger — confirms that it's a .NET executable that's heavily obfuscated. 

Figure 18 - xyz123.exe.

The execution starts at the class constructor (cctor) executing the
<Module>.ҭъЩӂӬҀУ\u0486\u0489їҒреӱҤЫѝйҹП()
method. It loads a large array into memory and decodes it. The rest of the cctor reconstructs a xs.dll and other code from the array and proceeds at the entry point with additional routines. At the end, it jumps by calling the P.M() method into the xs.dll.

Figure 19 - P.M() method.

This one is interesting because it presents us a well-known artifact that shows that the assembly was obfuscated with the Agile.Net obfuscator.

Figure 20 - Agile.Net obfuscator artifact.

Since there is no custom obfuscation, we can just execute the file, wait a while, and dump it via Megadumper, a tool that dumps .NET executables directly from memory. This already looks much better.

Figure 21 - Deobfuscated code step one.

Unfortunately, the obfuscator has encrypted all strings with the H.G() method and we cannot see the content of those strings.

Figure 22 - H.G() method

Luckily, the de4dot .NET deobfuscator tool kills this with one command. We just need to tell it which method in the sample is used to decrypt the strings at runtime. This is done by handing over the Token from the corresponding method, in this case, 0x06000001. De4dot has an issue with auto-detecting the Agile .NETobfuscator, so we have to hand over this function via the '-p' option.

Figure 23 - de4dot .NET deobfuscator.

Even if it looks like the operation failed, it has successfully replaced all obfuscated strings and recovered them, as we can see below.

Figure 24 - Decoded strings.

Examining the source code shows us that the adversaries are using an information stealer/RAT sold by a company selling grayware products: Agent Tesla. Agent Tesla contains a number of questionable functions, such as password stealing, screen capturing and the ability to download additional malware. However, the sellers of this product say that it is used for password recovery and child monitoring.  

Figure 25 - Sample of password stealing methods.

The malware comes with password-stealing routines for more than 25 common applications and other rootkit functions such as keylogging, clipboard stealing, screenshots and webcam access. Passwords are stolen from the following applications, among others:

  • Chrome
  • Firefox
  • Internet Explorer
  • Yandex
  • Opera
  • Outlook
  • Thunderbird
  • IncrediMail
  • Eudora
  • FileZilla
  • WinSCP
  • FTP Navigator
  • Paltalk
  • Internet Download Manager
  • JDownloader
  • Apple keychain
  • SeaMonkey
  • Comodo Dragon
  • Flock
  • DynDNS


This version comes with routines for SMTP, FTP and HTTP exfiltration, but is using only the HTTP POST one which you can see in figure 26 below. The decision as to which exfiltration method is used is hardcoded in a variable stored in the configuration, which is checked in almost all methods like this:

if (Operators.CompareString(_P.Exfil, "webpanel", false) == 0)
...
else if (Operators.CompareString(_P.Exfil, "smtp", false) == 0)
...
else if (Operators.CompareString(_P.Exfil, "ftp", false) == 0)

Figure 26 - HTTP exfiltration routine.

For example, it creates the POST request string, as you can see below in figure 27.

Figure 27 - POST request.

Then, it encrypts it with 3DES before sending it (figure 28). The _P.Y ("0295A...1618C") method in figure 25 creates the MD5 hash of the string. This hash is used as secret for the 3DES encryption.

Figure 28 - 3DES Encryption method



Conclusion


This is a highly effective malware campaign that is able to avoid detection by most antivirus applications. Therefore, it is necessary to have additional tools such as Threat Grid to defend your organization from these kinds of threats.

The actor behind this malware used the RTF standard because of its complexity, and used a modified exploit of a Microsoft Office vulnerability to download Agent Tesla and other malware. It is not completely clear if the actor changed the exploit manually, or if they used a tool to produce the shellcode. Either way, this shows that the actor or their tools have ability to modify the assembler code in such a way that the resulting opcode bytes look completely different, but still exploit the same vulnerability. This is a technique that could very well be used to deploy other malware in a stealthy way in the future.

IOC


Maldocs

cf193637626e85b34a7ccaed9e4459b75605af46cedc95325583b879990e0e61 - 3027748749.rtf

A8ac66acd22d1e194a05c09a3dc3d98a78ebcc2914312cdd647bc209498564d8 - xyz.123

38fa057674b5577e33cee537a0add3e4e26f83bc0806ace1d1021d5d110c8bb2 - Proforma_Invoice_AMC18.docx

4fa7299ba750e4db0a18001679b4a23abb210d4d8e6faf05ce2cbe2586aff23f - Proforma_Invoice_AMC19.docx

1dd34c9e89e5ce7a3740eedf05e74ef9aad1cd6ce7206365f5de78a150aa9398 - HSBC8117695310_doc


Distribution Domains

avast[.]dongguanmolds[.]com
avast[.]aandagroupbd[.]website


Loki related samples from hxxp://avast[.]dongguanmolds[.]com

a8ac66acd22d1e194a05c09a3dc3d98a78ebcc2914312cdd647bc209498564d8 - xyz.123

5efab642326ea8f738fe1ea3ae129921ecb302ecce81237c44bf7266bc178bff - xyz.123

55607c427c329612e4a3407fca35483b949fc3647f60d083389996d533a77bc7 - xyz.123

992e8aca9966c1d42ff66ecabacde5299566e74ecb9d146c746acc39454af9ae - xyz.123

1dd34c9e89e5ce7a3740eedf05e74ef9aad1cd6ce7206365f5de78a150aa9398 - HSBC8117695310.doc

d9f1d308addfdebaa7183ca180019075c04cd51a96b1693a4ebf6ce98aadf678 - plugin.wbk


Loki related URLs:

hxxp://46[.]166[.]133[.]164/0x22/fre.php
hxxp://alphastand[.]top/alien/fre.php
hxxp://alphastand[.]trade/alien/fre.php
hxxp://alphastand[.]win/alien/fre.php
hxxp://kbfvzoboss[.]bid/alien/fre.php
hxxp://logs[.]biznetviigator[.]com/0x22/fre.php


Other related samples

1dd34c9e89e5ce7a3740eedf05e74ef9aad1cd6ce7206365f5de78a150aa9398
7c9f8316e52edf16dde86083ee978a929f4c94e3e055eeaef0ad4edc03f4a625
8b779294705a84a34938de7b8041f42b92c2d9bcc6134e5efed567295f57baf9
996c88f99575ab5d784ad3b9fa3fcc75c7450ea4f9de582ce9c7b3d147f7c6d5
dcab4a46f6e62cfaad2b8e7b9d1d8964caaadeca15790c6e19b9a18bc3996e18


Vulnerability Spotlight: Linksys ESeries Multiple OS Command Injection Vulnerabilities

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These vulnerabilities were discovered by Jared Rittle of Cisco Talos.

Cisco Talos is disclosing several vulnerabilities in the operating system on the Linksys E Series of routers.

Multiple exploitable OS command injection vulnerabilities exist in the Linksys E Series line of routers. An attacker can exploit these bugs by sending an authenticated HTTP request to the network configuration. An attacker could then gain the ability to arbitrarily execute code on the machine.

The E Series is a line of routers for small and home offices that contain several features to make them easier to use. The routers are designed to connect home computers, internet-ready TVs, game consoles, smartphones and other Wi-Fi devices.

Vulnerability Details

TALOS-2018-0625 describes three related vulnerabilities: CVE-2018-3953, CVE-2018-3954 and CVE-2018-3955.

Many of the configuration details passed to the E Series of routers during their configuration must be retained across a device's power cycle. Since the device has only one writable directory (/tmp) and that directory is cleared on reboot, the device uses NVRAM to store configuration details.

All command injection paths follow this process:

When the apply.cgi page is requested with parameters indicating a change to persistent configuration settings, those parameters are processed by the 'get_cgi' function call during, which then get placed directly into NVRAM via a 'nvram_set' call.

After certain configuration changes are made, including both of the changes associated with these vulnerabilities, the device must be rebooted. The httpd binary handles this by sending a SIGHUP signal to PID 1, a binary named 'preinit'. The device then enters a code path where it restarts all necessary system services.

When the 'preinit' binary enters this code path, it exposes functionality where raw data from nvram_get calls is passed into system commands.

In CVE-2018-3953, the data entered into the 'Router Name' input field through the web portal is submitted to apply.cgi as the value to the 'machine_name' POST parameter. The machine_name data goes through the nvram_set process described above. Eventually, within the 'start_lltd' function, a 'nvram_get' call is used to obtain the value of the user-controlled 'machine_name' NVRAM entry. This value is then entered directly into a command intended to write the hostname to a file and then execute it.

CVE-2018-3954 applies to the same input field but follows a slightly different code path. Here, the vulnerability is triggered by 'set_host_domain_name' function in libshared.so where nvram_get is called against the 'machine_name' parameter. The result of that operation is subsequently combined with a string via a sprintf call and passed directly into the system command.

Finally, in CVE-2018-3955, the data entered into the 'Domain Name' input field through the web portal is submitted to apply.cgi as the value to the 'wan_domain' POST parameter. The wan_domain data goes through the nvram_set process described above.

When the 'preinit' binary receives the SIGHUP signal, it enters a code path that calls a function named 'set_host_domain_name' from its libshared.so shared object, which calls nvram_get against the 'wan_domain' parameter. The result of that operation is subsequently combined with a string via a snprintf call and passed directly into the system command.

Affected devices

The vulnerabilities are confirmed in multiple devices of the Linksys E Series of wireless routers with various firmware versions. Users are advised to update their routers to the latest version released by the manufacturer.

Discussion

Home routers have become one of the main targets for malicious attacks. Although these vulnerabilities require the attacker to have already authenticated with the device, the vulnerabilities are serious as they allow a potential attacker full control over the device, which may include installation of additional malicious code.

Widespread internet-of-things attacks such as Mirai and VPNFilter show that attackers will keep their focus on discovering new vulnerabilities which would allow them to infect devices and conduct large scale as well as targeted attacks. These attacks are more difficult to detect and protection is available only after their manufacturers update the firmware and patch the vulnerability.

Keeping the device firmware up to date is crucial to avoid SOHO routers participating in a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack or becoming an infection vector in an attack targeted to your organization.

Coverage

The following SNORTⓇ rule detects attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For all current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort rule: 47133


Vulnerability Spotlight: Live Networks LIVE555 streaming media RTSPServer code execution vulnerability

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These vulnerabilities were discovered by Lilith Wyatt of Cisco Talos.

Cisco Talos is disclosing a code execution vulnerability that has been identified in Live Networks LIVE555 streaming media RTSPServer.

LIVE555 Streaming Media is a set of open-source C++ libraries developed by Live Networks Inc. for multimedia streaming. The libraries support open standards such as RTP/RTCP and RTSP for streaming, and can also manage video RTP payload formats such as H.264, H.265, MPEG, VP8, and DV, and audio RTP payload formats such as MPEG, AAC, AMR, AC-3 and Vorbis. It is used internally by well-known software such as VLC and MPlayer.

An exploitable code execution vulnerability exists in the HTTP packet-parsing functionality of the LIVE555 RTSP server library. A specially crafted packet can cause a stack-based buffer overflow, resulting in code execution. An attacker can send a packet to trigger this vulnerability.



Vulnerability details


TALOS-2018-0684 describes the vulnerability CVE-2018-4013. The LIVE555 Media Libraries are a lightweight set of multimedia streaming libraries for RTSP/RTCP/RTSP/SIP, with code support for both servers and clients. They are utilized by popular media players such as VLC and MPlayer, as well as a multitude of embedded devices (mainly cameras).

One of the functionalities enabled by LIVE555 for their standard RTSP server is the ability to tunnel RTSP over HTTP, which is served by a different port bound by the server, typically TCP 80, 8000, or 8080, depending on what ports are available on the host machine. This port can support normal RTSP, but in certain cases, the HTTP client can negotiate the RTSP-over-HTTP tunnel.

The vulnerability exists in the function that parses HTTP headers for tunneling RTSP over HTTP. An attacker may create a packet containing multiple "Accept:" or "x-sessioncookie" strings which could cause a stack buffer overflow in the function "lookForHeader."

Affected software


The vulnerability is confirmed in Live Networks LIVE555 Media Server, version 0.92 but it may also be present in the earlier version of the product.


Coverage


The following SNORTⓇ rules detect attempts to exploit these vulnerabilities. Please note that additional rules may be released at a future date and current rules are subject to change pending additional vulnerability information. For all current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rules:




Tracking Tick Through Recent Campaigns Targeting East Asia

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This blog post is authored by Ashlee Benge and Jungsoo An, with contributions from Dazhuo Li.

Summary



Since 2016, an advanced threat group that Cisco Talos is tracking has carried out cyberattacks against South Korea and Japan. This group is known by several different names: Tick, Redbaldknight and Bronze Butler.

Although each campaign employed custom tools, Talos has observed recurring patterns in the actor's use of infrastructure, from overlaps in hijacked command and control (C2) domains to differing campaign C2s resolving to the same IP. These infrastructure patterns indicate similarities between the Datper, xxmm backdoor, and Emdivi malware families. In this post, we will dive into these parallels and examine the methods used by this actor.


Introduction


The APT threat actor known as "Tick," "Bronze Butler," and "Redbaldknight" has conducted espionage campaigns since 2016 against East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea [1]. Talos analyzed a recent campaign in which compromised websites located in South Korea and Japan were used as C2 servers for samples belonging to the malware family known as "Datper," which has the ability to execute shell commands on the victim machine and obtain hostnames and drive information. Talos found potential links in shared infrastructure between the malware families Datper, xxmm backdoor, and Emdivi, each of which has been attributed to this threat actor under one of the above three aliases.

We obtained this Datper variant through VirusTotal. The sample, written in Delphi code, was submitted toward the end of July 2018. Although the exact attack vector is unclear, the threat actor appears to have selected a legitimate-but-vulnerable Korean laundry service website to host their C2, shown below.

Legitimate Korean laundry site used as Datper C2 host.

The website, located at whitepia[.]co.kr, does not use SSL encryption or certificates. The specific URL used for C2 communication is:

hxxp://whitepia[.]co[.]kr/bbs/include/JavaScript.php

Once executed, the Datper variant creates a mutex object called "gyusbaihysezhrj" and retrieves several pieces of information from the victim machine, including system information and keyboard layout. Afterward, the sample attempts to issue an HTTP GET request to the above C2 server, which at the time of this writing, resolved to the IP 111[.]92[.]189[.]19.

An example of this request is:

GET /bbs/include/JavaScript.php?ycmt=de4fd712fa7e104f1apvdogtw HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko
Host: whitepia[.]co.kr
Cache-Control: no-cache

Unfortunately, at the time of this investigation, the C2 server was unavailable, preventing Talos from investigating C2 communications in greater detail. However, Talos was able to analyze a previous campaign from 2017, which employed a similar sample from this family and used a slightly different mutex, "d4fy3ykdk2ddssr." All samples in the diagram below, associated with the 2017 campaign, implemented mutex object "d4fy3ykdk2ddssr," likely to prevent access from other processes during execution.

Structure of C2 communications from the 2017 campaign.

The actor behind this campaign deployed and managed their C2 infrastructure mainly in South Korea and Japan. We confirmed that the actor periodically changed their C2 infrastructure and appears to have a history of identifying and penetrating vulnerable websites located in these countries. In addition to whitepia[.]co[.]kr, we identified other instances of compromised websites used as C2 servers. It is possible the malware samples are being delivered using web-based attacks, such as drive-by downloads or watering hole attacks. Additionally, Talos identified hosts used as C2 servers that may not be connected to a compromised website. This indicates the possibility that the threat actor may have initially deployed their C2 server infrastructure on legitimately obtained (and potentially purchased) hosts.

Overlaps in the compromised websites used as C2 domains suggest links to another malware family known as "xxmm backdoor" (or alternatively, "Murim" or "Wrim"), a malware family that allows an attacker to install additional malware. The GET request URI paths of xxmm backdoor and Datper are similar, as seen below:

xxmm backdoor: hxxp://www.amamihanahana.com/diary/archives/a_/2/index.php

Datper: hxxp://www.amamihanahana.com/contact/contact_php/jcode/set.html

Based on the findings above, both tools have used the same websites located in Japan in their C2 infrastructure since 2016.

The xxmm sample, shown on the right-hand side of the diagram above, has the hash 397a5e9dc469ff316c2942ba4b503ff9784f2e84e37ce5d234a87762e0077e25 [2].

The extracted PDB debug symbol paths from the sample are:

C:\Users\123\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\shadowWalker\Release\BypassUacDll.pdb

C:\Users\123\Documents\Visual Studio 2010\Projects\shadowWalker\Release\loadSetup.pdb

C:\Users\123\documents\visual studio 2010\Projects\xxmm2\Release\test2.pdb

C:\Users\123\Desktop\xxmm3\x64\Release\ReflectivLoader.pdb

In addition to the links between Datper and xxmm backdoor, a recent Datper variant compiled in March 2018 used a legitimate website as a C2, which resolved to the IP 211[.]13[.]196[.]164. This same IP was used as C2 infrastructure by the Emdivi malware family — a trojan that opens a backdoor on the compromised machine — and was attributed to the threat actor behind the campaign "Blue termite" [3].

Structure of 2018 Datper and Emdivi campaigns.

Our passive DNS lookup data of Resource Records (RR) for domains used by Datper and Emdivi further suggest that this IP was used by both malware families.

Resource record for Datper.

Resource record for Emdivi.

Conclusion


Talos' investigation into attacks conducted by this actor indicates commonalities between the Datper, xxmm backdoor, and Emdivi malware families. Specifically, these similarities are in the C2 infrastructure of attacks utilizing these malware families. Some C2 domains used in these attacks resolve to hijacked, legitimate South Korean and Japanese hosts and may have been purchased by the attacker. Successful attacks utilizing these malware families may result in shell commands being run on victim machines, resulting in a potential leak of sensitive information. Cisco security products protect our customers in a range of ways, detailed below.

Coverage


Additional ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below.


Advanced Malware Protection (AMP) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware used by these threat actors.

Cisco Cloud Web Security (CWS) or Web Security Appliance (WSA) web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks.

Email Security can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign.

Network Security appliances such as Next-Generation Firewall (NGFW), Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention System (NGIPS), and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat.

AMP Threat Grid helps identify malicious binaries and build protection into all Cisco Security products.

Umbrella, our secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs, and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network.

Open Source SNORTⓇ Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org.

IOCs:


Hashes

Datper

c2e87e5c0ed40806949628ab7d66caaf4be06cab997b78a46f096e53a6f49ffc

569ceec6ff588ef343d6cb667acf0379b8bc2d510eda11416a9d3589ff184189

d91894e366bb1a8362f62c243b8d6e4055a465a7f59327089fa041fe8e65ce30

5a6990bfa2414d133b5b7b2c25a6e2dccc4f691ed4e3f453460dee2fbbcf616d

7d70d659c421b50604ce3e0a1bf423ab7e54b9df361360933bac3bb852a31849

2f6745ccebf8e1d9e3e5284a895206bbb4347cf7daa2371652423aa9b94dfd3d

4149da63e78c47fd7f2d49d210f9230b94bf7935699a47e26e5d99836b9fdd11

a52c3792d8cef6019ce67203220dc191e207c6ddbdfa51ac385d9493ffe2a83a

e71be765cf95bef4900a1cef8f62e263a71d1890a3ecb5df6666b88190e1e53c

xxmm backdoor

397a5e9dc469ff316c2942ba4b503ff9784f2e84e37ce5d234a87762e0077e25

Emdivi

9b8c1830a3b278c2eccb536b5abd39d4033badca2138721d420ab41bb60d8fd2

1df4678d7210a339acf5eb786b4f7f1b31c079365bb99ab8028018fa0e849f2e

IPs used for C&C communication

202[.]218[.]32[.]135

202[.]191[.]118[.]191

110[.]45[.]203[.]133

61[.]106[.]60[.]47

52[.]84[.]186[.]239

111[.]92[.]189[.]19

211[.]13[.]196[.]164

C&C servers resolving to malicious IPs

hxxp://www.oonumaboat[.]com/cx/index.php
hxxp://www.houeikai[.]or.jp/images/ko-ho.gif

hxxp://www.amamihanahana[.]com/contact/contact_php/jcode/set.html

hxxp://www.amamihanahana[.]com/diary/archives/a_/2/index.php

hxxp://rbb.gol-unkai4[.]com/common/include/index-visual/index.htm

hxxp://www.whitepia[.]co.kr/bbs/include/JavaScript.php

hxxp://www.adc-home[.]com/28732.html

hxxp://www.sakuranorei[.]com.com/blog/index.php

Beers with Talos EP 39: VB 2018 Rundown and Prevalent Problems with PDF

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Beers with Talos (BWT) Podcast Ep. #39 is now available. Download this episode and subscribe to Beers with Talos:

If iTunes and Google Play aren't your thing, click here.

Ep. #39 show notes: 

Recorded Oct. 5, 2018 - We start out with a quick chat to get to know this week’s special guests from the Talos Outreach team: Paul Rascagneres, Vanja Svajcer and Warren Mercer. We discuss everyone’s work that was presented at Virus Bulletin, as well as Paul and Warren being nominated for the Péter Szőr Award. We also cover a lot of vulnerability discovery work that we recently released around various PDF software.

The timeline:

The topics

01:25 - Roundtable - Intros with our special guests Warren Mercer, Vanja Svajcer and Paul Rascagneres.
07:01 - Virus Bulletin and Korea in the Crosshairs nominated for Péter Szőr Award
22:42 - Other Talos talks and internet-of-things nonsense
28:39 - PDF vulnerabilities and how vulnerabilities can come in batches
35:23 - Closing thoughts and parting shots

The links

Péter Szőr Award: https://www.virusbulletin.com/conference/peter-szor-award/
Talos PDF vulnerability posts: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/search?q=pdf&by-date=true

==========

Featuring: Nigel Houghton (@EnglishLFC). Special guests: Warren Mercer (@SecurityBeard), Paul Rascagneres (@R00tBSD), and Vanja Svajcer (@VanjaSvajcer). Hosted by Mitch Neff (@MitchNeff).

Find all episodes here.

Subscribe via iTunes (and leave a review!)

Check out the Talos Threat Research Blog

Subscribe to the Threat Source newsletter

Follow Talos on Twitter

Give us your feedback and suggestions for topics:
beerswithtalos@cisco.com

Threat Roundup for October 12 to October 19

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Today, as we do every week, Talos is giving you a glimpse into the most prevalent threats we’ve observed this week — covering the dates between Oct. 12 and 19. As with previous roundups, this post isn’t meant to be an in-depth analysis. Instead, we will summarize the threats we’ve observed by highlighting key behavioral characteristics and indicators of compromise, and discussing how our customers are automatically protected from these threats.

As a reminder, the information provided for the following threats in this post is non-exhaustive and current as of the date of publication. Additionally, please keep in mind that IOC searching is only one part of threat hunting. Spotting a single IOC does not necessarily indicate maliciousness. Detection and coverage for the following threats is subject to updates, pending additional threat or vulnerability analysis. For the most current information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center, Snort.org, or ClamAV.net.

The most prevalent threats highlighted in this roundup are:

  • Win.Malware.Dgoh-6721301-0
    Malware
    This family is a generic trojan able to steal browser passwords. The samples conatain hidden hollowing techniques and TLS callbacks, making it more difficult to analyze. This malware is also evasive and can identify virtual environments. In this case, it does not show any network activity. The binaries achieve persistence and inject code in the address space of other processes.
     
  • Win.Malware.Tspy-6721070-0
    Malware
    Tspy is a trojan with several functions. It achieves system persistence to survive reboots. It also contacts domains related to remote access trojans (RATs) but are also known to be hosting C2 servers that send additional commands to the malware. The samples are packed and may hinder the analysis with anti-debugging techniques and TLS callbacks.
     
  • Win.Packed.Shipup-6718719-0
    Packed
    This signature and the IOCs cover the packed version of Shipup. These samples are packed and gain persistence by creating a scheduled task to conduct their activities. They also inject malicious code in the address space of other processes and may hinder the analysis with anti-debugging and anti-virtual machine checks.
     
  • Win.Malware.Icloader-6718315-0
    Malware
    Icloader is a generic malware family with an heavy adware behavior. The samples are packed and have evasive checks to hinder the analysis and conceal the real activities. This family can inject code in the address space of other processes and upload files to a remote server.
     
  • Win.Malware.Dfni-6718298-0
    Malware
    Dfni exhibits behaviors of adware, and can be considered a generic malware. The samples are packed and contain anti-VM checks, as well as many anti-debugging techniques. The binaries hook functions on the system and inject code to perform its malicious activities and upload files to a remote server.
     
  • Win.Malware.Mikey-6718286-0
    Malware
    This cluster focuses on malware that gives other malware the ability to achieve persistence. The samples contain anti-analysis tricks as well, which makes it tougher to study. This family is known for its plugin architecture and its intense network activity.
     
  • Win.Malware.Dinwod-6718271-0
    Malware
    This family is a polymorphic dropper. It copies modified versions of itself to the root directory with random names, then deletes the original files. These binaries drop a DLL that is injected. All the binaries are packed and contain tricks to complicate the static analysis phase.
     
  • Win.Malware.Triusor-6717792-0
    Malware
    Triusor is an highly polymorphic malware family. All the binaries are packed and obfuscated to hinder the static analysis. The malware contains code to complicate the dynamic analysis. Once it is executed, the samples perform code injection.
     

Threats

Win.Malware.Dgoh-6721301-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\WBEM\CIMOM
  • <HKLM>\SOFTWARE\CLASSES
  • <HKLM>\Software\Microsoft\Fusion\GACChangeNotification\Default
Mutexes
  • Global\CLR_CASOFF_MUTEX
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Files and or directories created
  • %WinDir%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\lastalive1.dat
  • \PC*\MAILSLOT\NET\NETLOGON
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\tmp3456.tmp
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\bhv35DC.tmp
File Hashes
  • 144dde1f11ae0c405712b370a8599c0497241e637e8fc82e72f64f909a88091e
  • 19287951443ce4dbf938aea1b13f859130d0a8a93581fef391a09d6b7c632157
  • 289f982e4f40d54431c2bfd462b9ab13334bb4038ce2bce60c78689ddddcf931
  • 35757c2e08e8536a0a8498cbbdbe4b7563e6bc03e9d3a443023d923d16fef052
  • 3a22acf82521b4afb12bb99e5c538a4ef329e929ff9b7f118da3a8296a00014a
  • 42442912f6d5d85b0465b6a81f579759123945c1eeae49fbeb1e14642c83a522
  • 44b3f421a16b418893ebf279dcb78302432059f06a240d061fad5cae4d570b0d
  • 45e1f1da441906c91474e8cd14d03a1360a44e1d3a0a716868b38d97a90fa728
  • 463e95e0cabd904e70facd1ad3698ac291f5963b55d6f9540e0afddf2e915c78
  • 4c695e0e5a5e74bfd9474b7ad56f1996eed68993b82e72f755e4654162c94286
  • 5eedbfbc1532012e6694da33a5bbb4213a566c7379d2c7ccbf4ed1fef6ca0fec
  • 79965e71b237768da06e87edaff46529864e0e3224866ffeb8291c6f9a95c4cc
  • 85ed48aef7052d974630e1e350c3557a509dd4f6f26a2ca31fc82b81f3e97417
  • 8e5c5f04842cb799b7ca42a2e47c02a8a0c53a21ea579a42d90115fe40149c4b
  • b2948e790aa955885082c85dc72d4be259001f68be6414b8d53e5a6ce60ed3c3
  • b731fbba5419d28bc588981182cf95cb142559c0184714f7f781544107670a75
  • ce7de4cc59658ee179955f1c9c475ceb5e0bffeb6eb0be35b97d99845b42e93c

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid



Win.Malware.Tspy-6721070-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
  • <HKLM>\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceClasses
  • <HKCU>\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\MY
  • <HKLM>\SAM\SAM\DOMAINS\ACCOUNT\USERS\000003E9
    • Value Name: F
  • <HKLM>\SAM\SAM\DOMAINS\ACCOUNT\USERS\000001F5
    • Value Name: F
  • <HKLM>\SAM\SAM\DOMAINS\ACCOUNT\USERS\000003EC
    • Value Name: F
Mutexes
  • N/A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 151[.]80[.]159[.]160
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • myp0nysite[.]ru
Files and or directories created
  • %System32%\config\SAM
  • %LocalAppData%\Temp\-218562641.bat
  • \TEMP\3101985327.exe
File Hashes
  • 22ef53123754caa2ac3871eb01221c99482e4318b59a30c8f07b9525afae52bd
  • 2953715def863a583bbca5dd830110b158d439ab138e278f7b4302e00b32349c
  • 356d54baec2c91a1acf01fba63efb0c372588b8af954f2ec06b713bd35fcebac
  • 46adc5747d33d6f76574f8c3df31828649159a8b0737b90233023db526f1df36
  • 4735ef713e8010be450f1114f5b47c56f7245e5511d5cf51c81cf4095331c2cc
  • 5431fac0d6c31b0234b32a360541d4142b01e020a3f5958a814aed2f7376c5d4
  • 5f51e8d0681a97d9cc8d08d8053be6ca7fe99570ce74437ceebc61277dd39295
  • 60eba00dd87e876f06d07940b33759f791c5deff12e5c435df38410a7be37b0f
  • 7a78e62befe10074809a5889aa2cb15b48ae18ff643ba9913f77e9277b9ddb5f
  • 7d22af262faaccd05bf7b1beeb2640babb7f9b635c33c55a1f116649702c6651
  • 816593fbb5469d27ac05c4eeaed262ce5486ceef3aa50f6a5991dbf87e0b6e29
  • 833ae0d041b2c2c7196105f2cc2a77c5aca67e701ef8407b5817639bdff9a88b
  • 902035ad4a8c6a13029757688b35a3494a8a914567b382e2d2ac831b43aa087a
  • 9e1ce778a3ce36fc530e6afe53aa4a5876bdc49ee9c3ecd06cd8098357022963
  • b1b6840d7b373303f2dee59b5735ac70895986c5670a6d00f6c71dc0b5bc9db7
  • d4d6b8126d2b3886cef618d0a38c16df140f3c261f50cb51b263ccd4dc0060a8
  • dea62764758a8f94fe90d430d70ffbfcb6781bf1e85a1df1370f4fdc13b96e0b
  • e2f3c345b99ee26a3277ce52e3577c2fe8c31faa13efe74476493444d99116ed
  • eef55e6ac86833cbfc3e70d40acd9672ebd68ea278b5bd72e6d33937fa60a39d

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid




Umbrella


Win.Packed.Shipup-6718719-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINDOWS
    • Value Name: LoadAppInit_DLLs
  • <HKLM>\SOFTWARE\WOW6432NODE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINDOWS
    • Value Name: AppInit_DLLs
  • <HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\SCHEDULE\HANDSHAKE\{F2B28AC6-1443-43F4-9832-8315397F35E8}
  • <HKLM>\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\SCHEDULE\HANDSHAKE\{F2B28AC6-1443-43F4-9832-8315397F35E8}
    • Value Name: data
Mutexes
  • N/A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Files and or directories created
  • %SystemDrive%\PROGRA~3\Mozilla\thfirxd.exe
  • %System32%\Tasks\aybbmte
  • %SystemDrive%\PROGRA~3\Mozilla\lygbwac.dll
  • %SystemDrive%\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\Mozilla\kvlcuie.dll
  • %SystemDrive%\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\Mozilla\tfbkpde.exe
  • %WinDir%\Tasks\kylaxsk.job
File Hashes
  • 039882173f4c41312943a6481bd41bddeb0603fc3077c09e99234bebd14266e5
  • 03bd8e2ed9a432a0883ea1acec24c87850127570809c63695bd542a602ba98bb
  • 03e346b9acec0f19bd9d6c0ac40b3ebfbd5e1097708ca6e744cf67ee79dcc9db
  • 04e34571fb0e04658c6d2eb23d908dbc378156fd094f861b7869b2281bc303b5
  • 05e7685b2efa6d6f1fb0c23c6c944f911728a35b2aaa1c1d0662631c374380ae
  • 07042f40f8e0114d7ea3f763a11fc2b0a5cc265238ad57f79710bfcd8917742e
  • 09ace282d6e455c62ba311a89dba6af3274d6e8096b2319c746a129e6c411143
  • 0d63b1289a4bf524359210fcfbfe84762f448911b51a495123b093ce5750ec3f
  • 0f9f448741905479e3504d81a56ada969d0e70287875bcaf18a08cfab63151e8
  • 1030c244fcf87f701b35f9a0fbad4f1e907dc0c5f8bc5ba6e4b6ca359bac9a09
  • 179c0c751b09104e903c6864d9bca8f46386d44ce24e4bf1ebd972be81a9bde3
  • 18205e2caa3af4a991891435f52a4b5f93e3405a1cbc2c88e2491d245fb33169
  • 186f16724db6160aafff7a7696b321d2bb070c6c794564c613904dabce6bf089
  • 194a07b39470d6f3d75292503dfb8d4c39a8a0b8d7a48ebd7b8bd3846e915e74
  • 19f9d7a380494e5329edcc1aefe1e1bbb8b3e97b4b437ebdc8253959b6f3c503
  • 1fb5b2a484b56dee8f91a761ddcd71aca409298d79717cbd305f8c4a115a377a
  • 21561b93554c509f88981504de06bf325182b11718e5e1bbc348b3e9bf40ab9b
  • 2222e6fcf6a7ab4fb824885a47869ff0b75b83c005ad1e56a48b9ac60603e00c
  • 23e1307f7478faf6edb20b4caf72344cfbdde1a3a88669433b07c15ab6276e78
  • 26074d1d9576a6f348861d388c6d33fe83154a4d6177ad128f327d56d61e93c4
  • 269d9e25d3fa50c06d20da82f572324448d689bb8131a9b146f9094aa6f35486
  • 27107374ee6385cc550f4cfe92a2b90b373f2f186d1c0cdac26d7cd941a45de1
  • 27ec15846eb320ef0fcd627e2606e51b398693df813f468eb8a08727005b6ccb
  • 2a199ff9c9922e8656a00622c5df7bc0db3b89d4ca5eda2ff304725b4e4791d3
  • 2c1f9fcebf203434c44710f59bbfd6b8dc7186cb472975964f4621fde162a9a7

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid


Win.Malware.Icloader-6718315-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
  • <HKCU>\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\POLICIES\MICROSOFT\SYSTEMCERTIFICATES\CA\Certificates
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\POLICIES\MICROSOFT\SYSTEMCERTIFICATES\CA\CRLs
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\POLICIES\MICROSOFT\SYSTEMCERTIFICATES\CA\CTLs
  • <HKLM>\Software\Wow6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA
  • <HKLM>\Software\Wow6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed
  • <HKLM>\Software\Wow6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root
  • <HKLM>\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople
  • <HKLM>\Software\Wow6432Node\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust
Mutexes
  • N/A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 195[.]201[.]249[.]16
  • 5[.]149[.]248[.]134
  • 185[.]87[.]195[.]36
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • static[.]16[.]249[.]201[.]195[.]clients[.]your-server[.]de
  • official-site-cheats[.]ru
Files and or directories created
  • %WinDir%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\lastalive1.dat
  • %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat
  • \ROUTER
File Hashes
  • 09bb7975b2b3841a5cdef1b88b8ac11093bdd4dbd494b4d6af270f848ea85f89
  • 12b1ee5b0cba81b875e5e51bfdc09e782d2a8cd77cc3fb239283898cba768815
  • 4ef33bcc856ec74000212666285ab7f944cda254bf8703339d385da81ba03433
  • 50ca40354710a54ee7eeef160fc7ef7a527890184c76579ad5dfb08cce7a345c
  • 544a3b3251664970097188e7557d476a5640404e0925a1bab3186de284c6f2a0
  • 5b87701da8929701c563806f7e2bdb5babe411cdffae08a63470c62a1f811674
  • a15f95b1440da055d9289084eae7adaefc0c53253e093f8ea07f6080a3f1bb16
  • c78cb949042685e156e2532f0ca8eb525c0c162384691c21436866d6477239c1
  • ce2d96827f323a716aed634705c39e22425e75b239f74945eb2669fecba4ef51
  • e5dd8c5e4b91ce17be74bb11e33f8b725aae330a8a78019232f438788b233784
  • e9a9a86b1cd0c1ee7ffbed8cfab0d463a899c6c070af3521f42d7d35ead8b96d

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid


Win.Malware.Dfni-6718298-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
  • <HKCU>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings
  • <HKLM>\Software\Microsoft\RAS AutoDial
Mutexes
  • \BaseNamedObjects\GenericSetupInstaller_UT006
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 195[.]201[.]249[.]16
  • 5[.]149[.]248[.]134
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • static[.]16[.]249[.]201[.]195[.]clients[.]your-server[.]de
Files and or directories created
  • \ROUTER
  • %SystemDrive%\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\7zSC54F3341\Carrier.exe
  • %SystemDrive%\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\7zSC54F3341\GenericSetup.exe
  • %SystemDrive%\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\7zSC54F3341\GenericSetup.exe.config
  • %SystemDrive%\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\7zSC54F3341\installer.exe
  • %TEMP%\Microsoft_Office_2003_Crack_Full_Version_Free.exe
File Hashes
  • 0b6f97ca1435e9264468c370f04f27ec1a1a73bd5ffc111ba3155c13fb98faa7
  • 21879cd4402d686df1b5216d0ee04b8205041ec88efa74b5647c1e8867aec045
  • 235354c4ff05fe220b4182745eb6cda23d346201bc1f0cd095fe9f5b365d9fc8
  • 263713f594a0bd2f1307fe7fc15802a4689c71fbe84641e6f2487d560265be27
  • 497be4c1fa250d9fbc98502a2d94ab7b9a8333a4320da73ef03073e4621e7c22
  • 51c88f1d544e08460f8460eb586db6f8064b59eac4927cc0762abe8ab395bcec
  • 551d34451ade2931165caf86f3ab48a833ad32e1625a32975961d0451e761967
  • 5a8db36dcddcb13c7e9fb5d975026292bfbd8c3618f0de45ce4cafb7470164d7
  • 60bc15b68fee8d28ba76e99475b2fadbf72a7efd2cee8eb12f23f8e5b88a9896
  • 6c730b4762c6f31e2b4c8845361650e5775bfd5876535d0f12523d22da4258f3
  • 79558d1978785896623d7f82404950345a0646ee20e78a75ca8cfbc70d828290
  • 7a1c9cf27ef8be7d94ad56517b8a7b79b8b508ee698667f266bb597f1cd5c6b0
  • 8530c888819eabbdfb0f3f3d149ae11a242a82a7f19d019e23a7e7846a231f3f
  • 8b0192dfdbe2214216a9b0d941e578d1652d2b220762d055bd8c881158107a46
  • 8e7a3a856d6f7a7e2ba824da91b47c9d2c9759e642ab42f046f1ac533a9fbe29
  • 93e9bff209879823e7ee4fe8a160526f15d0ee01f52992863b609b787c427502
  • 995ca1c36a5dc65ccbc878a74b08c6b36cbc282e792a9ba6767271f93f3cfdda
  • 9a1cddbba9b9dcf9c7c9d651c8fe390665b485895e26e78f4a1b4b1303c8c299
  • 9c736aea53c7b192afbdc97106e95f98804f4a5c7feaa92c0a7d796cf9092c12
  • a7c5b9cae00ea432de0723f4a71d3b266f152935e5ce8127d5c01c91ea156abe
  • abfcfc795d72a5afd80010f351ab683a61bfabde66b7b2c1813d7ac5cc9f65d6
  • add5411deb3f26fca1e60eb72757d0a2488f4bd3d44433afa71fd2c2afc84ec2
  • b172fcfae21952777f9bac5ecdc4695e120fe425cfa98db9169fdda5065a3848
  • b935519061e2af2022dcd28f94fc7747b87c6c952acffff5c5a034ae6c8e395c
  • b994e47854a8557397fb0ed73c2fa16e2a7099167ff605290f4ae1282951b2a0

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid


Win.Malware.Mikey-6718286-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • <HKLM>\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
Mutexes
  • RasPbFile
  • Local\http://hao.360.cn/
  • Global\b002b2c1-cf34-11e8-a007-00501e3ae7b5
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • 143[.]204[.]31[.]154
  • 143[.]204[.]31[.]216
  • 143[.]204[.]31[.]231
  • 143[.]204[.]31[.]105
  • 143[.]204[.]31[.]64
  • 143[.]204[.]31[.]128
  • 143[.]204[.]31[.]78
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • www[.]zhihu[.]com
  • www[.]zgny[.]com[.]cn
  • www[.]zhangmen[.]com
  • www[.]xs8[.]cn
  • www[.]zongheng[.]com
  • yule[.]360[.]cn
  • www[.]zhiyin[.]cn
  • yys[.]163[.]com
  • www[.]weibo[.]com
  • www[.]xxsy[.]net
  • www[.]youth[.]cn
  • yunpan[.]360[.]cn
  • you[.]163[.]com
  • xiaoshuo[.]360[.]cn
  • www[.]ymatou[.]com
  • www[.]youku[.]com
  • www[.]zol[.]com[.]cn
  • www[.]xiachufang[.]com
  • www[.]zhanqi[.]tv
  • yuehui[.]163[.]com
  • xqn[.]163[.]com
  • xiaoyouxi[.]360[.]cn
  • www[.]yy[.]com
  • xueqiu[.]com
  • www[.]xinhuanet[.]com
  • zonghe[.]hao[.]360[.]cn
  • xyq[.]163[.]com
Files and or directories created
  • %ProgramFiles% (x86)\DouTu\
  • %ProgramFiles% (x86)\DouTu\DouTuDaShi.exe
  • %ProgramFiles%\DouTu\DouTuDaShi.exe
File Hashes
  • 008f25d1573dc62790a69f7a80f5c5453cc5648fe75e2899c02763fe15ff2b0a
  • 011abed6d2117fd5f07cf18ba13fa84957111014baaa12037ae8dee7d342394b
  • 01c8e1e8e172e4605f818fca1c69ef8c92c5ac696248d3b9ccdfa41ac79f214b
  • 0247a8bbc1c947fcf3774ca4785f8896dcef41d0334b37dcf5bac1931d027463
  • 027a08518f203197ec8a4203a27a356b3e25c223e6920ea3809bbed0842028ad
  • 02989e9f1e9714b5c005b905ad9edccc155e4cba50ddcdaab759270a21ce5bd9
  • 02b19d089cdd330d32c2d7e26cb0e2575cb06a4af1d6d55dc100ae26798e4ed1
  • 02d6261ea6726eb0d1652ccd6e4469c29e029daafa4e97c2d91e1984267a7bcd
  • 02fd2646ae865182ba854029a5247ca1401146d82adf4aa7fe7289d5e50e170c
  • 036ba848a3d7f075c78fc8a61c9df37b347e092271532a4ea97e6c63bd69e014
  • 03750181545151e7ca1dba3b73b24f10a94b8728d58fb63c3f7be0d7307d445d
  • 03d612255a4c15406d36ad52ad1a36d03e894e0541fa46b27f36a460bb8e683f
  • 0445d150e6f6598afb477304f72a82d7d929affccbc49240f840a73846f0c32f
  • 045c8475c4206748d2bacbfbfad3696cce3eeeebc12b59ffd70db1b65238cb36
  • 045de43a1c41fa03972c7d7560e639b004eda82db939eb9bf9e42c074e3feae5
  • 046dd51f8b053aacf0ec0c5f267f78e1fda082abaf06a0ea627bcdab21261bc9
  • 04b95424c0d4857b95ec76b43831e050a84dbc9f6396a4ef02784a08237b1e1c
  • 05323e80a0d216c41f64a274cf8fd20a21cce709c1f45ad931bc1273f115000e
  • 053dee417b15f6231492987a7d4015a78025a6a0ceb996cd155651055c322be7
  • 055c4a203cb1230ae63c23100fe9d649b5551885c47c9388814fb6f41462dbac
  • 0563fa1ab4ddddf921ff3bb655498dc4eb91b3a6c679632888a6c81c20453912
  • 0580794965a50a2c165c7c33f0873759251340c57c57e67c5a71b4c26741b3f7
  • 063110c27a66a2bf0a1dd1f6acfe49ce521cb159f2a69bc896b1a7e6025a3c12
  • 06b7cd56f7a52f74181481506b1b757deb87c52e180ab87fa47cec734e11cbbd
  • 0707db8cc197898312024658ee079141f97d5b296589c616408c516a74e36af6

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid


Win.Malware.Dinwod-6718271-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • N/A
Mutexes
  • N/A
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Files and or directories created
  • \vnnjj.exe
  • \xxhdx.exe
  • \xxldt.exe
  • \xxlhl.exe
  • \vnjvvj.exe
  • \rvrnnf.exe
  • \rxjxbdx.exe
  • \vnrjn.exe
  • \rvrnbj.exe
  • \xxltpx.exe
  • \vnnbn.exe
  • \vnjrv.exe
  • \xxltxdh.exe
  • \xxlhptp.exe
  • \xxhtp.exe
  • \xxxpptl.exe
  • \xxpxthd.exe
File Hashes
  • 007afe2d9baf2e79d00facd2d2d8a4639a792549950386c4f08771ecdf86a5e5
  • 015cdf503ff9594a6fe59d9c2abce53201b36239758bf2341f4a57029daba488
  • 01758e0d8a5558093a58179ae367d4e2f61c10f0758531179aefc2646ba67dd0
  • 07c97c9e72fb5dbec619c404f63a11b912fc8cd8990c9c2f2a94997d41cbd693
  • 15df5a862fac9f36fa3d01654b477b69c83f0e6e3f34506df7cacc690277c031
  • 16347664bea3a83ff23d0f70bdfc89687cd318c9006f641f51e68812647209d8
  • 16d3e585d490cc2ace4d332483e6cfdb58e0b9601a60d8cb1b67fe37ed240f32
  • 1c9522f2196142541138d63c8540a50779766c018808c9dcbb9ae307fabb6727
  • 1ca02fc758959c2b256e2c102528ea5f7d638f2c5191877816f55ff218a491df
  • 280e74d7df292e3a70d32d6cf513477d99e2a8b00c9263a93177ce4f54dcfcd0
  • 2a430cc8543cce3005dcfe77a4c4672e055c5f809240ef8c0b4a5c5279335a9d
  • 32e231bbd83b5f5320a72ba32873ec1c72426b79e86f9c8fc53a3a068f54b01f
  • 39970304ec55d19bd8fb7e9085a16e1321fb4c1f56234dc7cb28ebf85c2559ef
  • 3b16d31f053dafae6636d5e9e6e177c6d3191d792f08f88ebb20eeab64004056
  • 3bc11dacaf93b0456579318c1adeffef853571a637ce549cb788785917b18630
  • 3f1a60c94db70e837c93a5606c622e83d7d728efba2ace44d5a1e25fb9928694
  • 40dffd1df7de4c7734b9d91197f1504abfdf0483041e86babce29800cf676bc5
  • 42760b3beca693ce536a40114e82b7140e9c31b0a0ea3bda6fd35145d385796c
  • 45727028125d1469bbd80957da53beccda382215eedf08749e166401188db598
  • 45965701e3a09e642aa72c4361dff31ab136c691a4b1d196ff040b07fef6ff3c
  • 494fb24fb1bec50a5373d81c28a65f1f3369ccb236e37aa307abb6218aa0bd72
  • 4bc8924ba147f81bc910a1f0a5225cfd25b78d91d8d8725df3db4edb2229732b
  • 4c7c63cd5f5a1a51850ad6c85e08fdfb7d4bf3add81bc45eb2ec3026314b6510
  • 567ee64a97f8ecbf847637702ceb1fce80c5c785ccb8b838bc544bb92657a11b
  • 5b5a40109c12f9ce3ed228625bd2d15e93b17fcee2ffb3d234714a7e0c4f8732

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP




ThreatGrid


Win.Malware.Triusor-6717792-0


Indicators of Compromise


Registry Keys
  • N/A
Mutexes
  • \BaseNamedObjects\---
IP Addresses contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Domain Names contacted by malware. Does not indicate maliciousness
  • N/A
Files and or directories created
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\FAXPATCH.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\NTSD.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\REGEDIT.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\SYSPARSE.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\AUTOCHK.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\AUTOFMT.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\EXPAND.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\SPNPINST.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\SYSTEM32\SMSS.EXE
  • %SystemDrive%\I386\TELNET.EXE
  • %ProgramFiles%\AutoIt3\SciTE\SciTE.exe
  • %ProgramFiles%\FileZilla FTP Client\filezilla.exe
  • %ProgramFiles%\Windows Media Player\wmplayer.exe
  • %ProgramFiles%\Windows NT\Accessories\wordpad.exe
  • %ProgramFiles%\Windows NT\Pinball\pinball.exe
  • %ProgramFiles%\Windows NT\dialer.exe
  • %ProgramFiles%\Windows NT\hypertrm.exe
File Hashes
  • 0011723df3b26754ca4ca2eceb09c499aae2c5cc4db928d7727b67c60e577139
  • 002095eb7f10ae09be653040d140ffa762a320afab5185852b7d41b52db61c6a
  • 004c07dd0fa5fad4fe4900cc2ef6bd1b2abb5af3bbcbb2e139b4ff322d4078df
  • 007c2a5cf0f4015a86245231df3d7852a2f65f983b81a4df0dead1085b89a0ed
  • 00eb80745eaf40fc6a96bfcf4e03947beb4fa89a12773dc2aa739ce3777b7678
  • 00ec92b171c50fc7f78b787ce2b441cc2c753d662e25e7d5fcc05e4675bad287
  • 011ef040200e15408460db169067da640b78eba15fad117b28f46b50532c5598
  • 0147aa37821a3897110ed304ec26a1ab06291f59bb0c358de00ad1692ab4ea11
  • 017ddae8c3e44d1b99cba912a1513065ae9883ed63b955297f9ce1dbbf5ffcfc
  • 02ae5aa484fe0a9ddbd128ef9dc13cbd8c8e6880f766a106bae88c783a86583b
  • 02f261c939842a80b16a4a58c91cec0e787e48f190e3e8f6363c4784df122763
  • 0341342a42497c4d2b6886d7ab770a529e266b60c438ad783a615b18c635714c
  • 04078fdc1594bdebbf36b02005c798a8d71e8fb2a4211ffd2fa6653a780ccb99
  • 041f132694ac497b5a0390928f1b5f45e8a1b407d7f33b5d56c4fcaef00d1e1e
  • 043db96315c845bdf388ef63ab097742ad9268b96ca78d6e8565b1a32f551892
  • 04bb15f07d48249864ed7d67485c15c9a90b141299fed80c2cc44ae60d05cfd7
  • 0541a1b37978cf9060e322597f35351d2429dfaf11707092a96743169e4e160f
  • 05aa9a9452f4c1c8a0ee90b6e9d7ce285a4773e171d0fd76c96e57d932243397
  • 05c83511d79d813e563085a8e8b950a20c28bfc5f546ae5e910da25d1cf3a9c3
  • 06261bfb80aa502c1b35d9a0ed627e79f25dca958a32520ea7b3ddaeb98d033e
  • 062eb62bdc94deeba133a244f40b449d7c79dbfd621a95b1dc4daf5405b26650
  • 0630c559b0d079b457072e6fafc912739f57921e84430ba903034b98f688052e
  • 069d85b9fca5faebe3d65e66fc385f208adc02dc2d937e8f73a0683cc5edd1a3
  • 06db79ae47b5da5da9afe655e67805a069fb9b1ccac54d8c21e6bba3390299e0
  • 07a37e10b07767b08e125bbf6d35b5926fdda391faf5d4d9a11dde4014917484

Coverage


Screenshots of Detection

AMP



ThreatGrid




Beers with Talos EP40: BWT XL feat. SuperMicro, Giant Patches, and More Mobile Malware

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Beers with Talos (BWT) Podcast Ep. #40 is now available. Download this episode and subscribe to Beers with Talos:

If iTunes and Google Play aren't your thing, click here.

Ep. #40 show notes: 

Recorded Oct. 19, 2018 — In celebration of episode No. 40 and hitting over 1 million downloads(!!!), we go XL. This episode is a bit long, but we go a bit deeper than usual to discuss a few things that are highly unusual — namely, the extra-large patches dropped by Oracle, and the extra-large questions surrounding the Bloomberg/Super Micro story. We also talk about a few mobile threats we have seen and what we have brewing in the mobile threat space.

The timeline:

The topics

01:25 — Roundtable: Skeevy JavaScript, Mighty Reds update, potato camera, Joel’s petty HVAC complaints, and whatever Twitter drama Craig is on about.
07:30 — Agent Tesla and Loki playing tricks.
12:30 — What’s next in mobile threats from Talos, and the problem with app store models.
24:04 — Oracle drops 302 patches. Fancy ... some would even say extravagant.
36:30 — The Super Micro Bloomberg incident: What the **** is going on here?

The links



==========

Featuring: Craig Williams (@Security_Craig), Joel Esler (@JoelEsler), Matt Olney (@kpyke) and Nigel Houghton (@EnglishLFC).
Hosted by Mitch Neff (@MitchNeff).
Find all episodes here.

Subscribe via iTunes (and leave a review!)

Check out the Talos Threat Research Blog

Subscribe to the Threat Source newsletter

Follow Talos on Twitter

Give us your feedback and suggestions for topics:
beerswithtalos@cisco.com

Vulnerability Spotlight: TALOS-2018-0635/0636 - Sophos HitmanPro.Alert memory disclosure and code execution vulnerabilities

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Marcin Noga of Cisco Talos discovered this vulnerability.


Overview

Cisco Talos is disclosing two vulnerabilities in Sophos HitmanPro.Alert, a malware detection and protection tool. Both vulnerabilities lie in the input/output control (IOCTL) message handler. One could allow an attacker to read kernel memory contents, while the other allows code execution and privilege escalation.


Vulnerability Details


TALOS-2018-0635 (CVE-2018-3970) - HitmanPro.Alert hmpalert Kernel Memory Disclosure Vulnerability.

An exploitable memory disclosure vulnerability exists in the IOCTL-handler function of Sophos HitmanPro.Alert, version 3.7.6.744. A specially crafted IOCTL request sent by any user on the system to the hmpalert device results in the contents from the privileged kernel memory returning to the user. You can read the full details of the vulnerability here.

TALOS-2018-0636 (CVE-2018-3971) -HitmanPro.Alert hmpalert Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

An additional exploitable vulnerability also exists in the IOCTL-handler function of Sophos HitmanPro.Alert, version 3.7.6.744. Similar to the vulnerability described above, any user on the system can send a specially crafted IOCTL request to the hmpalert device that allows the user to write to memory, resulting in remote code execution and privilege escalation. You can read the full details of the vulnerability here.

Coverage

The following SNORTⓇ rules will detect exploitation attempts. Note that additional rules may be released at a future date, and current rules are subject to change, pending additional vulnerability information. For the most current rule information, please refer to your Firepower Management Center or Snort.org.

Snort Rule: 47295-47296

To review our Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, please visit this site.
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